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INTRODUCTION
n 2013, China’s most powerful bureaucracy, the National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), began a se-
ries of proactive antitrust price investigations. Between 2008
and 2012, the first four years after the enactment of China’s new
I
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Anti-monopoly Law (AML),1 the NDRC only conducted forty-
nine price-related investigations.2 In 2013 alone, however, more
than eighty companies were investigated by the NDRC.3 As of
September 2014, 335 companies and industry associations have
been involved in the NDRC probe.4
Many large, multinational companies have become targets in
the flurry of NDRC investigations. For example, from 2014 to
2015, the NDRC fined multinational automakers Mercedes-
Benz, Audi, Chrysler, and Dongfeng-Nissan for restricting re-
sale prices of motor vehicles and associated spare parts.5 The
1. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Longduan Fa (中华人民共和国反垄断
法) [Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008)
CLI.1.96789(EN) (Lawinfochina) [hereinafter AML]. The term used to refer to
the “competition law” area varies among different countries. In the United
States, this area of law is referred to as “antitrust law.” In China, the term
used is “antimonopoly law.” In this article, “antimonopoly law,” “competition
law,” and “antitrust law” are used to refer to a set of laws that aims to fight
restraints on competition in the marketplace. In this article, the terms “com-
petition law,” “antimonopoly law,” and “antitrust law” are used interchangea-
bly.
2. Yu Lan & Zhou Rui, Zhongguo Fanjiage Longduan Huo Tupoxing Jin-
zhan, Yi Diaocha Anjian 49 Qi (中国反价格垄断获突破性进展已调查案件 49起)
[The Breakthrough of China’s Anti-price Monopoly Enforcement, Already In-
vestigated 49 Cases], CHINA NEWS (Jan. 4, 2013), http://finance.chi-
nanews.com/cj/2013/01-04/4454595.shtml.
3. Sue Hao & John Lenhart, China’s “Golden Year” of Antimonopoly Inves-
tigations, CHINA BUS. REV. (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.chinabusinessre-
view.com/chinas-golden-year-of-antimonopoly-investigations.
4. Lu Yanchun, Jin Yibu Zuohao Fanjiage Longduan Gongzuo (进一步做好
反价格垄断工作 ) [Further Improve the Work of Anti-price Monopoly], 1
ZHONGGUO JIAGE JIANDU YU FANLONGDUAN [PRICE SUPERVISION & ANTI-
MONOPOLY INCHINA] 11, 11 (2015).
5. See Guoxinban Juxing Fanlongduan Zhifa Gongzuo Qingkuang Xinwen
Chuifenghui (国新办举行反垄断执法工作情况新闻吹风会) [Press Conference
held by the Information Office of the State Council Regarding the Enforce-
ment of AML] (Sept. 17, 2014, 9:59 AM) [hereinafter Press Conference Regard-
ing AML Enforcement], http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/arti-
cle/i/201409/20140900733559.shtml. At the press conference, Xu Kunlin, the
former leader of the Antitrust Bureau of NDRC, stated that the NDRC inves-
tigated and fined Audi, Chrysler, and Mercedes-Benz for the companies’ use of
RPM. The penalty decision on Dongfeng-Nissan, however, was made in 2015.
See Dongfeng Richan Zai Guangdongsheng Shishi Jiage Longduan Bei Chufa
(东风日产在广东省实施价格垄断被处罚) [Penalty on Dongfeng Nissan for Pric-
ing Fixing], GUANGDONG DEV. & REFORM COMMISSION (Sept. 10, 2015),
http://210.76.72.13:9000/pub/gdsfgw2014/zwgk/gzdt/gzyw/201509/t20150910_
328993.html [hereinafter Guangdong DRC’s Decision on Dongfeng-Nissan].
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fines against the automakers totaled about $116 million USD.6
In addition, many foreign companies in a range of industries,
including automobile, infant formula milk, pharmaceuticals,
technology, and food packaging, have faced increased antitrust
scrutiny as a result.7
The rise in investigations has led many international observ-
ers and companies to express concern that China may be using
the AML in a discriminatory manner against multinational com-
panies to undermine their ability to compete with their Chinese
6. The amount was calculated based on the NDRC-disclosed decisions on
Mercedes-Benz, Audi, Chrysler, and Dongfeng-Nissan for implementing RPM.
See Jiangsu Province Price Bureau, Jiangsu Sheng Wujiaju Dui Benchi Gongsi
Jiage Longduan An Zuochu Xingzheng Chufa (江苏省物价局对奔驰公司价格垄
断案作出行政处罚) [Price Bureau Of Jiangsu Province Imposes Administrative
Penalty On Mercedes-Benz For Price Monopoly], JIANGSU PROVINCE PRICE
BUREAU (May 18, 2015), http://www.jswjj.gov.cn (search “Jiangsu Sheng
Wujiaju Chufa Juedingshu (2014) Sujia Fanlongduan Er Hao” (江苏省物价局
处罚决定书〔2014〕苏价反垄断案 2号); then follow the hyperlink) [hereinafter
Jiangsu Provincial Agency’s Decision on Mercedes-Benz]; Yiqi Dazhong
Xiaoshou Youxian Zeren Gongsi Bufen Aodi Jingxiaoshang Zai Huibeisheng
Shishi Jiage Longduan Bei Chufa (一汽大众销售有限责任公司部分奥迪经销商
在湖北实施价格垄断被处罚) [Penalty FAW-Volkswagen and Part Audi Distrib-
utors in Hubei Province for the Price Monopoly], HUBEIPROVINCEPRICEBUREAU
(Sept. 11, 2014),
http://www.hbpic.gov.cn/zwgk/gfwj/xzxkhcf/201701/t20170110_23774.html
[hereinafter Hubei Provincial Agency’s Decision on FAW-Volkswagen]; Kelai-
sile Ji Shanghai Diqu Bufen Jingxiaoshang Shishi Jiage Longduan Bei Yifa
Chachu (克莱斯勒及上海地区部分经销商实施价格垄断被依法查处) [Penalty on
Chrysler and Part Distributors in Shanghai District for the Price Monopoly],
SHANGHAI DRC (Sept. 11, 2014),
http://www.shdrc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jggl/jgjgdt/12463.htm [hereinafter Shanghai
Provincial Agency’s Decision on Chrysler]; see also Guangdong DRC’s Decision
on Dongfeng-Nissan, supra note 5.
7. See Keith Bradsher & Chris Buckley, China Fines Volkswagen and
Chrysler for Antitrust Violations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2014, at B2.
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counterparts in both the Chinese and global markets.8 In the re-
cent U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue9 sessions, the
United States also expressed concern and argued that the AML
should be enforced in a transparent and nondiscriminatory
way.10 China’s decision-makers11have taken pains to deny such
criticisms, however, claiming that the AML has been applied
equally to all companies.12 Also, Li Keqiang, the Premier of the
State Council of China, empathized that the AML does not se-
lectively punish multinationals.13
8. Impact of China’s Antitrust Law and Other Competition Policies on U.S.
Companies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Competition Policy of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1–2 (2010) (statement of Henry C.
Johnson, Jr., Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts & Competition Policy); see also
Oversight of the Antitrust Enforcement Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Regulatory Reform, Commercial & Antitrust Law of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 114th Cong. 2, 69–71 (2015); see also U.S.-CHINA BUS. COUNCIL,
COMPETITION POLICY AND ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA (May 2015),
https://www.uschina.org/reports/update-competition-policy-enforcement-
china.
9. The U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) is a high-level
dialogue for the United States and China to discuss a wide range of regional
and global strategic and economic issues between them. The S&ED was estab-
lished on April 1, 2009, and the most recent meeting took place on June 6–7,
2016. See 2016 Strategic and Economic Dialogue, U.S. EMBASSY BEIJING-
CHINA, http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/sed-2016.html (last visited Mar.
6, 2017).
10. For example, in the S&ED, the United States expressed: “Ensuring that
China implements its Antimonopoly Law (AML) in a transparent and non-dis-
criminatory manner has been a top priority for the U.S. government.” 2015
U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue U.S. Fact Sheet – Economic
Track, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (June 25, 2015), https://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/jl0094.aspx.
11. Here the term the “decision-makers” refers to all legal institutions and
individuals who are responsible for making decisions under competition laws,
such as antitrust agencies and courts.
12. Chen Rongxue, Guojia Fagaiwei Jiagesi Sizhang Xu Kunlin: Qinli
Zhongda Fanlongduan An (国家发改委价格司司长许昆林：亲历重大反垄断案)
[The Interview with the Head of Antitrust Bureau, Xu Kunlin: Experience Sig-
nificant Antimonopoly Cases], XINHUASHE [XINHUA NEWS AGENCY] (June 20,
2015), http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20150620/213322484073.shtml; see
also Press Conference Regarding AML Enforcement, supra note 5.
13. Zhou Xiaoyuan, Zhongguo Fanlongduan Bu Cunzai Xuanzexing Zhifa
(中国反垄断不存在选择性执法) [No Selective Enforcement of China’s AML],
RENMIN RIBAOHAIWAIBAN [PEOPLE’SDAILYOVERSEAS EDITION], Sept. 12, 2014,
at A2, http://www.scio.gov.cn/ztk/xwfb/2014/31540/sjfx31549/Docu-
ment/1380903/1380903.htm.
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This article will address China’s public enforcement of the
AML with respect to resale price maintenance (RPM). RPM is a
type of vertical price restraint. By entering into a typical RPM
agreement, resellers are required to adhere to a price or price
level set by a manufacturer.14 Implementing RPM agreements
may restrict resellers’ freedom in setting prices, limiting price
competition among resellers and affecting consumer welfare
with a high price. Meanwhile, it may generate procompetitive
effects, such as solving free-rider problem, improving products’
after-sale services, and facilitating new products’ market en-
try.15 Therefore, carrying out RPM affects competition and con-
sumer welfare in relevant markets, thus falling under the scru-
tiny of antitrust law. Enforcement of antitrust law is generally
divided into two categories: public and private enforcement.
Public enforcement occurs when an administrative agency has
the enforcement authority to investigate and issue administra-
tive decisions. Private enforcement, however, occurs when the
interests of private parties are affected by anticompetitive be-
havior. Rather than report to antitrust agencies, these parties
instead file civil lawsuits directly in courts to seek redress. This
article will focus on public antitrust enforcement through a dis-
cussion of RPM cases decided by the NDRC, one of three anti-
trust agencies in China.
Part I of this article will provide an in-depth review of nearly
all of the NDRC’s disclosed decisions regarding RPM from Au-
gust 2008 to March 2016. The discussion of these decisions in-
cludes background stories of the cases, which provide fundamen-
tal facts to analyze the factors that have shaped NDRC enforce-
ment. Part II will point out factors that have shaped NDRC en-
forcement in order to explore why multinationals are easily tar-
geted or why they are perceived to be easily targeted. There are
three major factors fueling this discussion.16 First is the “central
factor,” which states that domestic incentives drive the NDRC to
target multinationals in order to generate greater social impact,
14. ERNEST GELLHORN, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, & STEPHEN CALKINS,
ANTITRUST LAW ANDECONOMICS IN ANUTSHELL 339 (5th ed. 2004).
15. See SUHUA, FENXIANG XINGWEI DE FANLONGDGUIZHI (分销行为的反垄断
规制) [ANTITRUST SCRUTINY OFDISTRIBUTION PRACTICES] 15–19 (2012).
16. See generally David J. Gerber, Economics, Law & Institutions: The
Shaping of Chinese Competition Law, 26 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 271 (2008)
(suggesting that three factors affect decision-making: domestic incentive struc-
ture, foreign cognitive influence, and foreign institutional pressure).
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alleviate public dissatisfaction, and efficiently meet political or
regulatory goals. Second is the “external factor,” which articu-
lates that foreign cognitive influence has further caused uncer-
tainty and inconsistency of public antitrust enforcement because
these sources have led to varying perceptions of antitrust law
and its enforcement among antitrust decision-makers in China.
Third is the “internal factor,” which notes the impact of tradi-
tional Chinese culture and its notions of paternalism on anti-
trust enforcement. The internal factor is implicit but steadier
and more enduring than the other factors. This is exemplified by
the NDRC, who enforces antitrust law in a paternalistic manner
by encouraging companies to confess and carry out self-correc-
tive measures, as the agency expects, and to disclose only limited
information to the public. The analysis in Part II will suggest
that the NDRC has not deliberately discriminated against mul-
tinational companies. When these three factors function collec-
tively, however, multinationals become an easy target. There-
fore, such “discriminatory” enforcement by the NDRC is not in-
tended, but it is a consequence of the flaws in China’s antitrust
enforcement system.
Part III will conclude by providing suggestions for China,
which include implementing an enforcement system with spe-
cific rules and regulations to normalize and limit the NDRC’s
discretionary power. In addition, considering China’s present
situation, an analytical method for RPM should mirror the ap-
proach taken under EU competition law, which holds a stricter
attitude toward RPM than U.S. antitrust law. Finally, in the
conclusion, the article advocates for greater transparency and
improvements in the consistency of the NDRC decision-making
processes.
I. PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT OF RPM IN CHINA
Today, RPM remains one of the most controversial areas of an-
titrust law. Some jurisdictions treat RPM hostilely, but other ju-
risdictions analyze it with a more benign attitude. For example,
U.S. economists have argued extensively that RPM could en-
hance economic welfare and should be analyzed by “rule of rea-
son” rather than the “per se rule.”17 As a consequence, in 2007,
17. The per se rule for RPM was established in Dr. Miles Medical Co., v.
John D. Park & Sons Co. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that RPM is “a general
restraint upon alienation,” and its purpose is to destroy competition by fixing
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the U.S. Supreme Court abandoned the century-old per se rule
and adopted the rule of reason analysis for RPM in Leegin Crea-
tive Leather Prods., v. PSKS, Inc.18 Although commentators in
Europe have been arguing against the per se approach for RPM
for twenty years, it persists in nearly every member country of
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.19
Additionally, many Asian countries (like Japan, Korea, and Tai-
wan) still adhere to the per se approach when assessing RPM.20
China, as a new player in the field of antitrust law, stands at
a crossroads because a clear and consistent approach to as-
sessing RPM in the antitrust enforcement system has not been
formed thus far. While Article 14 of the AML prohibits monopoly
agreements that fix resale prices or restrict minimum resale
prices, 21 Article 14 has, nonetheless, led to controversy. The
NDRC has interpreted RPM agreements as per se illegal under
the AML, provided that they are not exempt under the condi-
tions set out in Article 15.22 Article 15 provides for an exemption
from the applicability of Article 14 if companies can prove that
the procompetitive effects of the RPM would not be offset by its
anticompetitive effects.23 Such procompetitive effects include:
improving technologies, developing new products, improving
product quality, reducing cost, increasing efficiency, and serving
public interests, among others.24
prices, so the court ruled that the RPM was a per se violation of antitrust law.
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). Under
the rule of reason, RPM is not per se illegal, but the test requires courts to
weigh procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of an RPM on a case-by-case
basis. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 S. Ct. 275, 279 (1997); see also Leegin
Creative Leather Prods., v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
18. Leegin Creative Leather Products, 551 U.S.
19. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Policy Roundtable on
Resale Price Maintenance, at 23, DAF/COMP(2008)37 (Sept. 9, 2009),
https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/43835526.pdf.
20. For example, the Japan Fair Trade Commission published the Guide-
lines Concerning Distribution Systems and Business Practices under the An-
timonopoly Act in 1991. In the guidelines, RPM is regarded as “in principle
illegal as an unfair trade practice.” See id. at 153. In Korea, Article 29 of the
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) clearly states that RPM is
“per se illegal.” See id. at 161. In Taiwan, Article 18 of the MRFTA also applies
the per se illegal rule for RPM. See id. at 241.
21. AML, supra note 1, art. 14.
22. Id. art. 15.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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In contrast, Chinese courts, like the one inRainbow v. Johnson
& Johnson, interpret Article 14 to only prohibit monopoly agree-
ments rather than RPM agreements generally.25 The court there
reasoned that Article 14 of the AML attempts to condemn agree-
ments that eliminate or restrict competition and defines such
agreements as monopoly agreements. 26 Therefore, under the
AML, RPM agreements are not per se illegal, and only RPM
agreements that have the effect of eliminating or restricting
competition are restricted.27
A. Overview
This section will address two fundamental issues. First, it will
draw a brief picture about RPM, which includes the definition
and categories of RPM. Then it will introduce the antitrust sys-
tem of public enforcement in China, which helps us understand
how the NDRC operates in this system.
1. What is RPM?
It is general knowledge that firms always seek the most cost-
effective way to distribute their products. In other words, firms
attempt to find the lowest cost or most effective way of distrib-
uting products in order to maximize profits.28 Manufacturers
may sell their products directly to end consumers through their
“own employees, agents, or wholly owned subsidiaries.”29 Other
manufacturers, however, may choose to sign distribution con-
tracts with independent distributors (such as jobbers, wholesal-
ers, or retailers) to reach the consumer.30
Both self-distribution and independent dealer distribution are
pervasive;31 however, the method of distribution largely depends
on firm size and product characteristics. For example, a local
small flower store may utilize its own employees to quickly
25. See Beijing Ruibang Yonghe Tech. & Trade Co., Ltd. (Rainbow) v. John-
son & Johnson Med. (Shanghai) Ltd. & Johnson & Johnson Med. (China) Ltd.,
2014 SUP. PEOPLE’SCT. GAZ. (Shanghai Higher People’s Ct. 2013) (China).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND
EXECUTION 181 (2008).
29. PHILLIP E. AREEDA, LOUIS KAPLOW, & AARON S. EDLIN, ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 534 (6th ed. 2004).
30. Id. at 534.
31. HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, at 181.
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transport fresh bouquets rather than hire express delivery com-
panies because it is too expensive. Unilever, however, may
choose to sign contracts with large retailers (like Walmart or
Walgreens) to carry its shampoos and toothpastes rather than
running its own retail stores. Because people generally prefer to
purchase groceries in one store, distributing such groceries
through independent retail stores is most efficient.32 For other
products, manufacturers may use independent dealers to exclu-
sively distribute their products to maintain product quality, to
guarantee before-sale and after-sale services, and to motivate
dealers to carry their products. 33 Valuable products or well-
known brands, such as Mercedes-Benz automobiles, Apple elec-
tronic products, and Hermès handbags, for example, are nor-
mally sold through such distribution arrangements.
When firms choose to use independent distributors rather
than self-distribute their products, the relationship between
them is vertical. This manufacturer-dealer vertical relationship
can involve many forms of vertical restraint.34 These restraints,
which are subject to antitrust law, occur when those involved in
the vertical supply chain impose restrictions on product distri-
bution.35
Vertical restraints can be divided into several categories ac-
cording to different standards. Depending on whether a re-
straint involves price restrictions, vertical restraints can be clas-
sified as price restraints (e.g., RPM) or nonprice restraints (e.g.,
territorial restrictions).36 RPM, for example, is a price restraint
because it requires dealers to sell products at certain prices. A
territorial restriction, however, is a nonprice restraint because
it insulates appointed dealers from competition from others who
sell the same products of the manufacturer, but it does not di-
rectly restrict prices. 37
Further, depending on the impact on competition, vertical re-
straints may be categorized as restraints on intrabrand compe-
tition (e.g., RPM) or restraints on interbrand competition (e.g.,
32. Id. at 182.
33. See id. at 202–06.
34. AREEDA, KAPLOW, & EDLIN, supra note 29, at 534.
35. MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 302
(2004).
36. SeeHOVENKAMP, supra note 28, at 186–90.
37. SeeGELLHORN, KOVACIC, & CALKINS, supra note 14, at 359.
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tying).38 Intrabrand restraints occur when a manufacturer seeks
to limit competition among dealers carrying its products. The
manufacturer may require its dealers to adhere to the same re-
tail prices and/or separate its dealers geographically. In doing
so, only competition among dealers carrying the manufacturer’s
brand is limited, but competition among different brands is not
affected. Through interbrand vertical restraints, however, man-
ufacturers use restrictions to limit competition among different
brands. Tying and exclusive dealing agreements are typical in-
terbrand restraints. Tying, for example, occurs when a dealer is
required to purchase a freezer (tied product) as a condition to
buying a manufacturer’s ice cream (tying product). Additionally,
exclusive dealing agreements, as the name implies, require deal-
ers to sell only a manufacturer’s product and no one else’s
brand.39 In the context of automobiles, for example, an exclusive
dealing agreement occurs when a dealer selling Mercedes-Benz
automobiles is prohibited from distributing Chevrolet cars.
Shifting to RPM, these agreements can be categorized as price
restraints of intrabrand competition. These restraints come in
three varieties: (1) restrictions of the minimum resale price, (2)
restrictions of the maximum resale price, and (3) fixing the re-
sale price.40 Because fixing resale price and restricting minimum
resale price prevent consumers from purchasing products at a
lower price, most antitrust laws focus on these RPMs rather
than maximum RPMs.41 This article will therefore focus on fix-
ing or minimum RPMs, unless stated otherwise.
38. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, at 183–84.
39. See id. at 184.
40. See GELLHORN, KOVACIC, & CALKINS, supra note 14, at 340–52.
41. For example, Article 14 of the AML only states that fixing and minimum
RPM monopoly agreements should be prohibited, but does not address maxi-
mum RPM. See AML, supra note 1, art. 14. Under EU competition law, hard-
core restrictions are “agreements or concerted practices having as their direct
or indirect object the establishment of a fixed or minimum resale price or a
fixed or minimum price level. . . .” Compared to other vertical restraints, the
hardcore restriction can only be exempted under much stricter conditions. See
Commission Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para. 48, 2010 O.J. (C 130) (EC)
[hereinafter Commission Guidelines on Vertical Restraints].
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2. Profile of Public Antitrust Enforcement in China—a Two-
Tiered and Tripartite System of Authority
The AML provides a two-tiered administrative structure to en-
sure enforcement of the Act.42The top tier is the Anti-monopoly
Commission of the State Council (“Anti-monopoly Commission”),
which is responsible for formulating policies and guidelines re-
lated to competition, coordinating high-level strategies, and su-
pervising the overall enforcement of the AML.43 After the AML
was enacted, the State Council appointed three administrative
agencies—the NDRC, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM),
and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce
(SAIC) to enforce the AML. The three agencies can be thought of
as the second tier of the enforcement mechanism. Specifically,
both the NDRC and the SAIC are responsible for investigating
monopoly agreements, abuse of dominant market positions, and
abuse of administrative power. 44 The difference between the
NDRC and SAIC’s responsibility is whether the relevant conduct
is price-related.45 In other words, the NDRC is responsible for
investigating price-related behaviors, while the SAIC oversees
nonprice-related behaviors. MOFCOM is responsible for review-
ing mergers and international cooperation related to competi-
tion laws.46 In the scope of this article, investigating and making
decisions regarding RPM fall within the NDRC’s authority.
42. AML, supra note 1, arts. 9, 10.
43. Id. art. 9.
44. See Guojia Gongshang Xingzheng Guangli Zongju Zhuyao Zhize Neishe
Jigou He Renyuan Bianzhi Guiding (国家工商行政管理总局主要职责内设机构和
人员编制规定) [Regulations of the SAICMajor Duties, Internal Institutions and
Personnel] (July 11, 2008), sec. B, art. 6 [hereinafter Regulations of the SAIC],
http://gkml.saic.gov.cn/auto3743/200809/t20080901_112597.htm?type=1; see
also Guojia Fazhan He Gaige Weiyuanhui Zhuyao Zhize, Neishe Jigou He
Renyuan Bianzhi Guiding（国家发展和改革委员会主要职责内设机构和人员编制
规定) [Regulations of the NDRC Major Duties, Internal Institutions and Per-
sonnel] (Aug. 21, 2008), sec. C, art. 23 [hereinafter Regulations of the NDRC],
http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2008-08/21/content_1076506.htm.
45. See Regulations of the SAIC, supra note 44; Regulations of the NDRC,
supra note 44.
46. Shangwubu Zhuyao Zhize Neishe Jigou He Renyuan Bianzhi Guiding (
商务部主要职责内设机构和人员编制规定) [Regulations of the MOFCOM Major
Duties, Internal Institutions and Personnel] (Aug. 22, 2008), sec. C, art. 11,
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ae/ai/200808/20080805739577.html.
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At the local level, the NDRC authorizes its local agencies at
the provincial level (local agencies in provinces, autonomous re-
gions, and municipalities directly under the central government,
collectively referred to as “Provincial Agencies”) to enforce the
AML within their respective administrative region, and, if nec-
essary, the NDRC can require them to cooperate with its inves-
tigations.47 The authorized Provincial Agencies’ activities are
also under the NDRC’s supervision.48
B. Cases of RPM
Historically speaking, many Chinese companies have used
RPM.49 An increasing number of high profile investigations and
decisions between August 2008 and March 2016 by the NDRC,
however, have alerted companies to be cautious in using
RPM. This section will discuss the NDRC’s investigations into
companies in the liquor, infant formulamilk, corrective lens, and
motor vehicle industries, which include the background story
and decision of each case.
47. Guanyu Fanjiage Longduan Zhifa Shouquan de Jueding (关于反价格垄
断执法授权的决定) [Decision About Authorization of Anti-price Enforcement’s
Authority] (promulgated by the NDRC, Dec. 15, 2008, effective Dec. 15, 2008),
Order No. [2008] 3509 (China) [hereinafter Decision About Authorization of
Anti-price Enforcement’s Authority], http://www.xxpi.com/Article/ShowArti-
cle.asp?ArticleID=10061; see also Provisions on the Administrative Procedures
for Law Enforcement Against Price Fixing (promulgated by the State Dev. &
Reform Comm’n, Dec. 29, 2010, effective Feb. 1, 2011) art. 3, CLI.4.143498(EN)
(Lawinfochina) [hereinafter Provisions on the Administrative Procedures for
Law Enforcement Against Price Fixing]. In addition, the names of Provincial
Agencies vary among the different provinces. In some provinces, they are called
“Development and Reform Commissions.” In other provinces, they are called
“Price Bureaus.”
48. Decision About Authorization of Anti-price Enforcement’s Authority, su-
pra note 47; Provisions on the Administrative Procedures for Law Enforcement
Against Price Fixing, supra note 47.
49. Zhou Rui, Moutai Chufa Jiangjia Jingxiaoshang, Zhuanjia Cheng Hu-
ojiang Zhaozhi Fanlongduan Diaocha (茅台处罚降价经销商, 专家称或将招致反
垄断调查) [Moutai Punished Discounters, Experts Claimed It May Cause Anti-
trust Probe], CHINA NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 11, 2013), http://finance.chi-
nanews.com/cj/2013/01-11/4481529.shtml.
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1. The Liquor Case
In 2013, the NDRC imposed penalties on two of the most fa-
mous state-owned Chinese producers of premium liquor for us-
ing RPM. This marked the first time the NDRC penalized RPM
under the AML.
a. Background Story: Luxury Gift-Giving Culture and a Politi-
cal Incident
Kweichow Moutai Co., Ltd. (“Moutai”) and Wuliangye Yibing
Co., Ltd. (“Wuliangye”), two state-owned liquor producers in
China, specialize in producing premium alcoholic spirits (also
known as “premium white spirits” in China). According to sta-
tistics issued by the China Alcoholic Drinks Association in 2006,
the sales volume of premium white spirits was merely 0.48% of
the whole white spirits industry, but the sales revenue ac-
counted for 15% of the white spirits industry.50 As leading pro-
ducers of high-priced white spirits, Moutai and Wuliangye own
roughly 75% of the market share in the high-priced white spirits
market.51
The popularity of Moutai and Wuliangye’s products could be
explained by the importance of white spirits in Chinese culture.
White spirits are traditionally served during special occasions,
such as weddings, family gatherings, reunions, and business or
official banquets. White spirits are also popular gifts due to the
tradition of Chinese gift-giving. Because of its price, the white
spirits produced by Moutai and Wuliangye are usually chosen as
gifts for official or business purposes. Therefore, such preference
of picking white spirits as gifts further increases the price, which
has soared since 2009. For example, the average retail price of
Moutai was 800 yuan per bottle ($123 USD per bottle) in 2009.52
By the end of 2011, the price increased to 2,000 yuan per bottle
($308 USD per bottle), and in January 2012, the price reached
50. Zhang Juan & Tan Liyong, Woguo Baijiu Hangye de Xianzhuang Yu
Fazhan Qushi (我国白酒行业的现状与发展趋势) [Current Situation and Devel-
opment of White Spirits Industry in China], 5 SHIDAI JINGMAO [ECON. & TRADE
UPDATE] 57, 58 (2007).
51. Id. at 58.
52. 2015 Nian Zuixin, Jianguo Yilai Linian Maotaijiu Jiage Biao (2015年
最新， 建国以来历年茅台酒价格表) [The Latest Calculation in 2015, The Price
Figure of Moutai Since the Founding of PR China], JIUZHIWANG [LIQUORWEB]
(Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.cnjiuzhi.com/price/p6706.html.
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its peak of 2,250 yuan per bottle ($346 USD per bottle).53Wul-
iangye also admitted that the wholesale prices of its liquors in-
creased by 20 to 30 percent as of September 10, 2011.54
On February 5, 2012, however, President Xi Jinping, the newly
elected General Secretary of the Communist Party in China, is-
sued his “eight-point principles” for government officials, which
imposed a form of austerity on civil servants.55 President Xi
hoped to end extravagant taxpayer-financed banquets and
bribes that are typically associated with the giving of gift-
wrapped luxuries, such as premium white spirits.56 This politi-
cal incident was one of the major reasons why this best-selling
period of premium white spirits ended.57
As a result, the sale of Moutai and Wuliangye’s white spirits
plummeted before the 2013 Chinese New Year, which used to be
a peak selling season.58 During this time period, the price of
Moutai dropped to 1,900–2,300 yuan per bottle ($292–$354 USD
per bottle), compared to 2,600–3,000 yuan per bottle ($400–$462
USD per bottle) in the previous Chinese New Year. Further, the
prices of Wuliangye spirits even dropped below 1,000 yuan per
bottle ($154 USD per bottle) during this time.59Despite the price
53. Zhang Xin & Liu Jingyi, Canting Shou Moutai, Jieqian Po Liangqian (
餐厅售茅台, 节前破两千) [The Price of Moutai Reached 2,000 RMB/Bottle Be-
fore the Spring Festival], XINHUA WANG [XINHUA NET] (Jan. 28, 2013),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2013-01/28/c_124289908.htm.
54. SHENZHEN STOCK EXCHANGE, YIBINWULIANGYE GUFEN YOUXIAN GONGSI
DONGSHIHUI GONGGAO (宜宾五粮液股份有限公司 董事会公告) [WULIANGYE’S
ANNOUNCEMENT OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS] (Aug. 30, 2011), http://disclo-
sure.szse.cn/m/finalpage/2011-08-31/59901595.PDF.
55. Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhengzhiju Zhaokai Huiyi Shenyi Guanyu Gai-
jin Gongzuo Zuofeng, Miqie Lianxi Qunzhong de Youguan Guiding, Fenxi Yan-
jiu 2013 Nian Jingji Gongzuo (中共中央政治局召开会议审议关于改进工作作风
、密切联系群众的有关规定 分析研究二〇一三年经济工作) [CPC Central Com-
mittee Political Bureau Holding Meeting to Improve the Work, Keeping Close
Contact with the Masses, and Analyzing the Economic Work in 2013],
PEOPLE.CN (Dec. 5, 2012), http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2012/1205/c64094-
19793530.html.
56. As the first point, President Xi emphasizes that no banquet or reception
should be held or arranged for civil servants, as gifts and premium wines are
traditionally given and served in such banquets and receptions. See id.
57. Xu Bing, “Baxiang Guiding” Duiyu Jingji de Yingxiang (“八项规定”对于
经济的影响) [The Impact of “Eight Principles” on The Economy], LIAOWANG
ZHONGGUO [OUTLOOK CHINA], http://www.outlookchina.net/tem-
plate/news_page.asp?id=6392&page=1 (last visited Mar. 24, 2017).
58. Zhang Xin & Liu Jingyi, supra note 53.
59. Id.
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decrease and distributors’ promotional efforts, the market for
high-priced white spirits remained sluggish.60
In response, Moutai and Wuliangye required their dealers to
strictly implement RPM in order to prevent the retail price from
decreasing.61 According to disclosed information from the Pro-
vincial Agencies, beginning in 2009, Wuliangye entered into
more than 3,200 RPM agreements with independent distribu-
tors. 62 For those who violated these RPM agreements, Wul-
iangye imposed various punishments, such as reducing supply,
confiscating deposits, deducting market supporting fees, and im-
posing fines.63 For example, in 2011, Wuliangye stopped supply-
ing a large-scale supermarket chain because it sold Wuliangye
white spirits below the minimum resale price set by Wul-
iangye.64 Further, in 2012, Wuliangye punished fourteen distrib-
utors in eleven provinces and municipalities for “selling below
the restricted price” by confiscating deposits and cutting fees for
market promotions.65 The CEO of Moutai stated publicly: “The
key assignment of the company is to avoid these price drops. . .
.”66 Like Wuliangye, Moutai also punished three dealers for sell-
ing Moutai white sprits below the required price floor. Moutai
imposed a penalty of 20 percent of deposits on the three dealers
as a result of their violations of the RPM and threatened to re-
voke their distribution agreements in the event of future viola-
tions.67
60. Id.
61. Sichuan Dev. & Reform Comm’n,Wuliangye Gongsi Shishi Jiage Long-
duan Bei Chufa 2.02 Yiyuan (五粮液公司实施价格垄断被处罚 2.02 亿元) [The
Penalty of 202 Million Yuan on Wuliangye’s Price Monopoly Behavior],
SCDRC.GOV (Feb. 22, 2013), http://www.scdrc.gov.cn/dir25/159074.htm [here-
inafter Sichuan Provincial Agency’s Decision on Wuliangye].
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Yang Qiubo, Moutai Huiying Jiage Longduan Jiancha, Chexiao Dui
Xiangguan Jingxiaoshang Chufa (茅台回应价格垄断检查撤销对相关经销商处罚
) [Moutai Responses to the Price Monopoly Investigation and Revoking Punish-
ments on Distributors], CAIXIN.COM (Jan. 16, 2013), http://compa-
nies.caixin.com/2013-01-16/100483460.html.
67. Id.
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b. The NDRC’s Decisions
The NDRC authorized Provincial Agencies in Sichuan prov-
ince and Guizhou province to investigateWuliangye andMoutai,
respectively, 68 and the agencies started investigating around
January 2013.69 In response to the Guizhou agency’s investiga-
tion, Moutai declared on its official website that (1) all of the
company’s marketing policies that violated the AML would be
terminated immediately, (2) punishments for distributors would
be revoked, and (3) all confiscated deposits would be returned to
distributors. 70 One day later, Wuliangye made a similar an-
nouncement on its website.71
Despite the two companies’ “confessions,” however, the Provin-
cial Agencies imposed on Moutai and Wuliangye fines calculated
as 1 percent of each company’s sales revenue of the previous
year.72 Both companies paid the penalties in full in less than a
68. This is because Wuliangye is headquartered in Sichuan province and
Moutai is headquartered in Guizhou province.
69. In the end of December 2012Wuliangye andMoutai punished their deal-
ers for violating the RPM agreements. See Sichuan Provincial Agency’s Deci-
sion on Wuliangye, supra note 61; see also Guanyu Moutai Jiage Longduan de
Gonggao (贵州物价局关于”茅台价格垄断罚款”公告) [Penalty Decision on Mou-
tai’s Price Monopoly], CFDA.COM (Feb. 25, 2013),
http://www.cfda.com.cn/newsdetail.aspx?id=61047 [hereinafter Guizhou Pro-
vincial Agency’s Decision on Moutai]. Shortly thereafter, on January 16, 2013,
Moutai made an announcement on its official website claiming that it would
stop implementing RPM agreements because of the Provincial Agency’s inves-
tigation. One day after, Wuliangye made a similar announcement. See Kwei-
chow Moutai Group,Maotai Gonggao (茅台公告) [Moutai Announcement] (Jan.
16, 2013) [hereinafter Moutai Announcement], http://www.china-mou-
tai.com/xinwen/2013/645.html; see also Wuliangye, Wuliangye Gonggao (五粮
液公告) [Wuliangye Announcement] (Jan. 17, 2013) [hereinafter Wuliangye
Announcement], http://www.wul-
iangye.com.cn/zh/main/main.html#/g=NEWS&id=33&dId=50. Therefore, it is
reasonable to infer that the agencies conducted their investigations between
the end of December 2012 and January 16, 2013. Because, normally, compa-
nies respond quickly after the agencies launch their investigations, it is likely
that the agencies started the probes only one or two days before the companies
made their announcements.
70. Moutai Announcement, supra note 69.
71. Wuliangye Announcement, supra note 69.
72. See Sichuan Provincial Agency’s Decision on Wuliangye, supra note 61;
see also Guizhou Provincial Agency’s Decision on Moutai, supra note 69. Gui-
zhou Provincial Agency imposed a 247 million RMB fine on Moutai, and Mou-
tai’s annual report of 2012 revealed that its sales volume was 26.4 billion RMB
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month.73 While each of the Provincial Agencies issued their re-
spective decisions, these decisions are brief with insufficient
analysis. Compared to the Guizhou agency’s one paragraph de-
cision regarding Moutai, the Sichuan regulators disclosed rela-
tively more information relating to Wuliangye. The Sichuan
Regulators stated that by entering into price-restricting agree-
ments and dividing geographical markets, Wuliangye set the
price floor for products, which were vertical monopoly agree-
ments and violated Article 14 of the AML.74 Such behaviors thus
restricted and eliminated the competition and harmed consum-
ers’ welfare.
2. The Infant Formula Milk Case
In 2013, the NDRC fined six multinational infant formula milk
producers for implementing RPMs in violation of the AML. The
NDRC launched the investigation on multinational dairy com-
panies because prices of foreign-brand infant formula milk con-
tinuously increased after 2008, when Chinese domestic brands
were involved in a food-safety scandal.
a. Background Story: The 2008 Chinese Milk Scandal Boosted
Foreign Brands’ Prices
In 2008, China’s infant formula milk industry was involved in
a food-safety scandal.75 Several domestic brands of infant for-
mula milk were found to be adulterated with melamine, a toxic
chemical.76The contaminated milk powder caused almost three
hundred thousand babies to become ill, and six infants died of
in 2012. SeeMOUTAIANNUALREPORT 2012, at 6 (Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.mou-
taichina.com/touzi/2013/337.html. Therefore, although Guizhou Provincial
Agency did not clearly state the percentage of sales volume used to calculate
the fine, one can deduce that, as in the Sichuan Provincial Agency’s decision,
the fine on Moutai was 1 percent of its sales volume earned in the previous
year.
73. Chen Jie, Moutai Wuliangye Yi Quan’e Jiaona 4.49 Yiyuan Jiage Long-
duan Fadan (茅台五粮液已全额缴纳 4.49亿元价格垄断罚单) [Moutai and Wul-
iangye Paid the Penalty of CNY$449Million in Full], NEWS.CN (Mar. 14, 2013),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/photo/2013-03/14/c_124460543.htm.
74. Sichuan Provincial Agency’s Decision on Wuliangye, supra note 61.
75. Yang Fan, Zhongguo Ruye Zhe Wunian (中国乳业这五年) [Five Years of
China’s Dairy Industry], PEOPLE.CN (2013), http://paper.peo-
ple.com.cn/xaq/html/2013-10/01/content_1324677.htm.
76. Id.
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kidney stones and kidney damage.77 Afterward, it came to light
that a well-known domestic brand of infant formula milk was
contaminated with enterobacter sakazakii, a life-threatening
bacterium to infants.78 Later, several domestic milk brands were
accused of selling milk powder that caused infants to have dan-
gerously high levels of female hormones.79
As a result of safety concerns, the scandal ruined the reputa-
tion of infant formula milk producers in China, and Chinese par-
ents resorted to purchasing foreign brands instead.80 Prior to the
milk scandals in 2008, domestic milk producers accounted for
more than 60 percent of the market share. After the scandal,
however, the market share dropped to 48 percent in 2013.81 Due
to Chinese parents’ obsession with foreign infant formula milk
and the growing distrust of domestic brands, prices of foreign-
brand infant formula milk have increased by at least 30 percent
since 2008.82
b. The NDRC’s Decision
On August 7, 2013, approximately five months after launching
the investigation, the NDRC imposed fines totaling 668.73 mil-
lion yuan (about $102.88 million USD) on six manufacturers of
infant formula—five foreign producers and one Hong Kong com-
pany—for restricting the minimum resale price with distribu-
tors in violation of Article 14 of the AML.83
According to the NDRC’s decision, the involved companies
fixed their products’ resale prices or restricted the minimum re-
sale prices and punished violators through various methods,
77. China Dairy Products Found Tainted with Melamine, BBC NEWS (July
9, 2010), http://www.bbc.com/news/10565838.
78. Yang Fan, supra note 75.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Edward Wong, Chinese Search for Infant Formula Goes Global, N.Y.
TIMES, July 26, 2013, at A1.
83. Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, Heshengyuan Deng Rufen Shengchan
Qiye Weifan Fanlongduan Fa Xianzhi Jingzheng Xingwei Gongbei Chufa
6.6873 Yiyuan (合生元等乳粉生产企业违反《反垄断法》限制竞争行为共被处罚
6.6873亿元) [Penalty onMilk Powder Producers of Restricting Competition and
Fined 668.73 Million Yuan], NDRC,
http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/xwzx/xwfb/201308/t20130807_552991.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 29, 2016) [hereinafter NDRC Decision on Infant Formula Milk Pro-
ducers].
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such as imposing fines, deducting rebates, and limiting or stop-
ping supply.84 The NDRC further claimed that infant formula
milk producers restricted resale prices, boosted prices, elimi-
nated intrabrand competition, and damaged consumers’ wel-
fare.85 Furthermore, the decision also disclosed that all the com-
panies involved admitted that their conduct constituted RPM
and that they failed to prove that their conduct could satisfy the
exemption requirements under Article 15 of the AML.86
Notably, the NDRC investigated nine companies in total, but
it only imposed penalties against six companies.87 The NDRC
did not penalize three companies because they voluntarily re-
ported their RPM to the NDRC. Among the six companies, the
NDRC gave mitigated penalties to five of them because they pro-
actively cooperated with the investigation and/or carried out
self-corrective measures.88 The varying penalties imposed by the
NDRC can be seen in Figure 1.89
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Penalties on infant formula producers.90
90. Data is taken from disclosed information provided by the NDRC. See
NDRC Decision on Infant Formula Milk Producers, supra note 83; see also Gu
Zhengping, Ying’er Peifang Naifen Qiye Zao Chuangjilu Zhongchuang, Cong
Chufa Jieguo Fenxi Fanlongduanfa Xia Kuada Zhengce de Juti Yunyong (婴儿
配方奶粉企业遭创纪录重罚从处罚结果分析反垄断法下宽大政策的具体运用) [The
Huge Penalty on Infant Formula Producers, Analysis of the Application of Le-
niency Policy by the NDRC], CLI.A.216737 (2013), http://v6.pkulaw.cn/lawfir-
marticles/1778401633.html (Lawinfochina).
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3. The Corrective Lens Case
Before the AML’s enactment, it was a well-known “secret” that
distributors of corrective lenses (such as eyeglasses and contact
lenses) received monopolistic profits. To a large extent, such
profits can be attributed to implementing RPM. In 2013, how-
ever, the NDRC investigated and punished several multina-
tional producers in the corrective lens market for making these
agreements.
a. Background Story: Abnormally High Profits and Boycott of
Discounters
According to a report by Southern Urban Daily in 2005, the
cost of eyeglass lenses was normally less than 10 percent of re-
tail prices.91 Further, in 2013, an undercover journalist disclosed
the incredibly high profits received by distributors of the largest
corrective lens retail market in Beijing: eyeglass frames cost
only 16–25 yuan ($2–$4 USD) to produce, but retailers charged
customers between 200–500 yuan ($31–$77 USD) for the same
pair.92 The wholesale price of eyeglass lenses was only 8 yuan
($1.2 USD), but the retail price was approximately 300 yuan
($46 USD).93
With such extravagant markups, some savvy distributors be-
gan to reduce prices in order to gain a larger market share. In
two cities, a few “pioneers” created “eyeglass supermarkets,”
which offered affordable prices.94 For various reasons, however,
such businesses faded away rather quickly. In Wuhan City, for
example, manufacturers stopped supplying the eyeglass super-
markets with their brands and removed the existing stock from
91. Yang Xiaohong & Fan Suxian, Kaiye Yitian Zao Fengsha, Hangye Baoli
Nanrong Pingjia Yanjingdian? (开业一天遭封杀行业暴利难容平价眼镜店？) [Be
Boycotted on the First Business Day, No Room for Discounters?], SOUTHCN.COM
(Feb. 23, 2005), http://www.southcn.com/news/dishi/guang-
zhou/jingji/200502230417.htm.
92. Yi Fangxing & Shen Zhimin, Beijing Bufen Yanjingdian Xiaoshou You
“Zhangyanfa” (北京部分眼镜店销售有”障眼法”) [“Tricks” of Eyeglasses Selling
in Beijing], BEIJINGNEWS, Apr. 15, 2013, at A16–17.
93. Id.
94. See Dijia Xiaoshou Tiaozhan Hangye Qianguize, Pingjia Yanjingdian
Zao “Zhiming Fengsha” (低价销售挑战行业潜规则 平价眼镜店遭”致命封杀”)
[Selling with Low Prices Challenges Unspoken Rules in Industry, Eyeglasses
Supermarket been Deadly Boycotted], CNR.CN (Aug. 14, 2013),
http://china.cnr.cn/yaowen/201308/t20130814_513312136.shtml; see also Yang
Xiaohong & Fan Suxian, supra note 91.
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their shelves.95 These manufacturers claimed that they were
threatened by other distributors, who said that they would stop
carrying their brands unless the manufacturers stopped supply-
ing products to discount retailers, such as eyeglass supermar-
kets.96
The Eyeglasses Business Association in Guangzhou City also
played a key role in squeezing the discounters out of the market.
The Eyeglasses Business Association, which has ninety-seven
members (of which twenty-nine are eyeglass retailers), held a
meeting in January 2005 in Guangzhou City with its members
and issued a public letter encouraging its members to stop sup-
plying brands that discounters sold.97 After the issuance of the
public letter, one third of the suppliers discontinued supply and
removed the existing stock of corrective lenses from the dis-
counters’ shelves.98
b. The NDRC’s Decisions
In August 2013, the NDRC launched an investigation into the
corrective lens market and publicized its decision on May 29,
2014.99 According to disclosed information, the NDRC ordered
three Provincial Agencies—Beijing, Shanghai, and Guang-
dong—to investigate the corrective lenses producers within their
administrative regions.100
Three aspects of the decisions deserve greater attention. First,
although RPM is a common phenomenon in the corrective lens
market, the NDRC only investigated and fined several “produc-
ers of well-known brands” that had larger market shares,101 all
of which are branches of multinational companies in China’s
95. Yang Xinci,Wuhan Shoujia Pingjia Yanjing Chaoshi Zao Fengsha (武汉
首家平价眼镜超市遭封杀) [Boycott to the First Discounter of Eyeglasses in Wu-
han City], SOUHU.COM (Mar. 27, 2006),
http://news.sohu.com/20060327/n242492655.shtml.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, Bufen Yanjing Jingpian Shengchan Qiye
Weichi Zhuanshou Jiage Xingwei Bei Yifa Chachu (部分眼镜镜片生产企业维持
转售价格行为被依法查处) [Imposed Penalty on Part Corrective Lenses Produc-
ers’ RPM], SDPC.GOV (May 29, 2014),
http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/gzdt/201405/t20140529_613562.html [hereinafter
NDRCDecision on Corrective Lenses Producers].
100. Id.
101. Id.
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market.102 The NDRC claimed that these producers restricted
distributors’ rights to freely set their own prices through RPM
agreements.103 In this way, manufacturers eliminated and weak-
ened the price competition by raising and maintaining prices at
a high level.104 The NDRC, however, did not investigate or de-
cide whether there were price cartels (horizontal price-fixing
agreements) among distributors or whether the Eyeglasses
Business Association assisted in reaching and maintaining such
price cartels. From the news reports mentioned above, the in-
dustry association in Guangzhou City played a key role in help-
ing dealers to fix the minimum resale prices. Unfortunately,
from the disclosed information, the NDRC did not mention any
investigations or fines imposed on the distributors or the indus-
try association.
Second, the NDRC, for the first time, used the term RPM in
the headline of the NDRC-issued decision. Previously, in the liq-
uor case, the NDRC used the term “price monopoly,”105 while in
the infant formula milk case it used the phrase “behaviors of re-
stricting competition” in the headline of the decision to refer to
such arrangements.106 Some scholars note that RPM is a legal
term transplanted from U.S. antitrust law, which indicates that
the NDRC may follow the U.S. model in analyzing RPM, and
argue that the NDRC should instead follow the analyzing model
of EU competition law.107 While this argument seems suspect be-
cause the mere use of the term does not necessarily determine
which model the NDRC actually follows, the inconsistent use of
terms in the NDRC’s decisions, at the very least, reveals the
102. They involved companies of the Shanghai branch of French Essilor, the
Beijing branch of Japan’s Nikon, the Guangzhou branch of German Zeiss, the
Beijing branch of U.S.-based Bausch & Lomb, and the Shanghai branch of
U.S.-based Johnson & Johnson. See id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Sichuan Provincial Agency’s Decision on Wuliangye, supra note 61;
see also Guizhou Provincial Agency’s Decision on Moutai, supra note 69.
106. See NDRC Decision on Infant Formula Milk Producers, supra note 83.
107. See Hong Yingying, Woguo Xianzhi Zhuanshou Jiage Zhidu de Tixihua
Jieshi Jiqi Wanshan (我国限制转售价格制度的体系化解释及其完善) [The Sys-
tematic Explanation and Improvement of RPM in China], 4 HUADONG DAXUE
XUEBAO [ECUPL J.] 49, 57; see also Liu Xu, Jianping: Guojia Fagaiwei Chachu
Bufen Yanjingpian Shengchan Qiye Weichi Zhuanshou Jiage Xingwei (简评：
国家发改委查处部分眼镜镜片生产企业维持转售价格行为) [Analysis on the
NDRC’s Penalty on Part Eyeglasses Producers’ RPM], BLOG.SINA (May 30,
2014), http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_6afc758f0101fisp.html.
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agency’s uncertain attitude regarding the approaches to analyz-
ing RPM.
Third, as in the infant formula milk case, the NDRC in the
corrective lens case exempted some companies from paying a
penalty because they voluntarily reported the RPM to the NDRC
and gave mitigated penalties to others for proactively cooperat-
ing with the investigation and/or carrying out self-corrective
measures. The difference, however, is that the infant formula
milk producers received mitigated penalties calculated as 3 to 4
percent of the previous year’s sales revenue, while in the correc-
tive lens case, producers were given mitigated penalties of a
mere 1 to 2 percent, even though the mitigated penalties were
granted for similar reasons. Figure 2 displays the fines imposed
on the involved companies and the NDRC’s reasoning for its de-
cisions.
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Figure 2. Penalties on corrective lens producers.
4. The Automotive Industry Cases
The NDRC’s investigation of the automotive industry has been
referred to as a “storm,” which has attracted close attention and
concern from the automotive industry and the antitrust commu-
nity.108 From 2014 to 2015, the NDRC imposed fines totaling
108. Liu Xu, “Fengbao Zhong” de Qicheye Yu “Fengbao Shi de” Fanlongduan
Zhifa (“风暴中”的汽车业与”风暴式的”反垄断执法) [The Vehicle Industry in “A
Storm” and The “Stormy” Antitrust Enforcement], PENGPAINEWS (Aug. 7, 2014),
http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1260375_1.
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over two billion yuan ($308 million USD) on companies in the au-
tomotive market.109 In 2014, the NDRC fined Audi (a Volkswagen
subsidiary) and Chrysler (a Fiat subsidiary) for restricting re-
sale prices of motor vehicles and their spare parts.110 Several
months later, Mercedes-Benz was also fined 350 million yuan
($56 million USD) because it implemented RPM agreements.111
Further, in 2015, Dongfeng-Nissan and its seventeen dealers in
Guangdong Province were fined a total of 142.4 million yuan
($22.25 million USD) for engaging in RPM.112 Other than RPMs,
the NDRC also investigated and ultimately penalized twelve
Japanese companies—eight auto parts manufacturers and four
bearings manufacturers—for reaching horizontal agreements to
manipulate prices through a price cartel.113 In Hubei Province,
four distributors of Bayerische Motoren Werke (BMW) were
fined for conspiring to charge a uniform fee for inspecting motor
vehicles before delivering them to consumers.114 In light of the
subject matter of this article, the following section will only ad-
dress cases related to RPM.
109. Bai Chaoyang & Zhou Ju, 2015 Qiche Liutong Xiehui Nianhui Toulu 5
Da Fanlong
duan Redian (2015汽车流通协会年会透露 5大反垄断热点) [Five Hot Issues Dis-
closed in the 2015’s Auto Distribution Association Annual Meeting],
AUTOREPORT (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.autore-
port.cn/cjgz/20151107/0906564608.html.
110. See Hubei Provincial Agency’s Decision on FAW-Volkswagen, supra note
6; see also Shanghai Provincial Agency’s Decision on Chrysler, supra note 6.
111. See Jiangsu Provincial Agency’s Decision on Mercedes-Benz, supra note
6.
112. See Guangdong DRC’s Decision on Dongfeng-Nissan, supra note 5.
113. Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, Riben Shi’er Jia Qiye Shishi Qiche Ling-
bujian He Zhoucheng Jiage Longduan Bei Guojia Fazhangaigewei Fakuan
12.35 Yiyuan (日本十二家企业实施汽车零部件和轴承价格垄断被国家发展改革委
罚款 12.35亿元) [Penalty of 1.235 Billion Yuan on Twelve Japanese Companies
of Price Monopoly on Auto Spare Parts and Bearings], NDRC,
http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/gzdt/201408/t20140820_622756.html (last visited on
Mar. 30, 2016).
114. Hubei Province Price Bureau, Guifan Qiche Xiaoshou Zhong de Jiage
Xingwei Tixing Gaojiehui (规范汽车销售中的价格行为提醒告诫会) [Warning
Meeting on Distributors about Charging PDI Fees], HUBEI (Aug. 13, 2014),
http://gkml.hubei.gov.cn/auto5472/auto5509/201408/t20140813_516440.html.
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a. Background Story: RPM Was Once Supported by an Admin-
istrative Rule
In 2005, three years before the enactment of the AML, the
NDRC, SAIC, and MOFCOM collectively enacted Measures for
the Implementation of the Administration of Automobile Brand
Sales (“Measures”).115 The goal of the Measures is to regulate
branded automotive sales.116 It permits manufacturers or gen-
eral dealers of branded motor vehicles to use their discretion in
establishing their distribution network, which includes, among
others, determining resale prices, allocating geographic distri-
bution markets, and providing requirements for after-sale ser-
vices.117 Moreover, the Measures states that distributors cannot
carry any other brands without the authorization of the manu-
factures.118 Also, authorized distributors cannot sell motor vehi-
cles to other distributors unless they have the permission of the
manufacturers, and, thus, can only sell to end consumers.119
Following the provisions established in the Measures, the 4S
retail model quickly became the most popular method for multi-
national auto producers and general dealers to distribute their
automobiles in the Chinese market. The 4S represents sales,
showrooms, services, and spare parts. A 4S store equips all four
functions under one roof.120 The branded motor vehicle manufac-
turers or imported motor vehicles’ general dealers have control
over 4S stores, including the location and decoration of the
stores, investment in these stores, and the fees charged for after-
sale services and spare parts.121 Operators of 4S stores, however,
are independent distributors. As a result, each brand’s distribu-
tion network is its own closed system in which intrabrand com-
petition is highly restricted.
115. Qiche Pinpai Xiaoshou Guanli Shishi Banfa (汽车品牌销售管理实施办法
) [Measures for the Implementation of the Administration of Automobile Brand
Sales] (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, Feb. 21, 2005, effective Apr.
1, 2005), CLI.4.57048 (EN) (Lawinfochina).
116. Id. art. 1.
117. Id. art. 6.
118. Id. art. 27.
119. Id. art. 28.
120. SUHUA, supra note 15, at 203–04.
121. See Liu Jin,Qiche 4S XiaoshouMoshi de Fanlongduan Fa Guizhi Yanjiu
(汽车 4S 销售模式的反垄断法规制研究) [Study of 4S Model of Motor Vehicle
Sales Under the AML], 8 SHENGCHANLIYANJIU [PRODUCTIVITYRES.] 110 (2010).
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In the beginning, the Measures played an important role in
regulating the chaotic auto market and attracting foreign com-
panies to export their motor vehicles to China and to invest in
the Chinese market. In 2009, China “emerged from the global
recession as the world’s largest auto market,” with a total sales
revenue that surpassed that of the United States.122 To a certain
extent, such impressive growth can be attributed to the
Measures.
The drawbacks of the Measures, however, have gradually been
exposed in recent years. While brandmanufacturers and general
dealers continue to reap high profits, consumers must pay high
prices to purchase these vehicles, and retail dealers shoulder the
high costs of operating a 4S store.123 For this reason, many crit-
ics have called for action to dissolve each brand’s closed distri-
bution network and to boost intrabrand competition, which
would require repealing the Measures.
Since 2014, the NDRC has investigated and fined several well-
known auto manufacturers for implementing RPM agreements.
The NDRC’s recent investigations of RPM agreements seems to
have paved the way for the enactment of the Measures for Auto-
mobile Sales (“New Measures”), which was published to solicit
public opinion on January 6, 2016, and is expected to be passed
in 2017.124 If the New Measures is passed, the Measures will be
repealed, and motor vehicle manufacturers will no longer have
as much control over the distribution of their brands as they cur-
rently do. For example, under New Measures, a dealer can sell
motor vehicles without the manufacturer’s authorization.125 In
addition, spare parts for a particular brand can be resold to other
122. Kyle Sullivan, China’s Auto Retail Market, CHINA BUS. REV. (July 1,
2010), http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/chinas-auto-retail-market.
123. Xu Xinyu & Su Hua, Qiche Shichang Zongxiang Longduan Xingwei de
Jieding Yu Guizhi (汽车市场纵向垄断行为的界定与规制) [Definition and Regu-
lation of Vertical Monopoly Behaviors in Automobile Market], 6 ZHONGGUO
JIAGE JIANGUANYUFANLONGDUAN [PRICESUPERVISION&ANTIMONOPOLYCHINA
J.] 21, 24 (2014).
124. Qiche Xiaoshou Guanli Banfa (Zhengqiu Yijian Gao) (汽车销售管理办法
（征求意见稿）) [Measures for the Administration of Automobile Sales (Draft)]
(drafted by the Ministry of Commerce, Jan. 6, 2016),
http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/as/201601/20160101227922.shtml.
125. Article 9 states that, if dealers do not obtain authorization from manu-
facturers, they shall give written notice to consumers to express the lack of
such authorization and shall notify consumers who is responsible for the qual-
ity of the vehicles. See id. art. 9.
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independent dealers as well as to consumers.126 Further, a man-
ufacturer cannot prevent its dealers from providing after-sale
services for other brands.127 As a result, New Measures would
promote intrabrand competition and remove restrictions placed
on the after-sales service market.
b. NDRC and its Provincial Agencies’ Decisions
From 2014 to 2015, the NDRC’s flurry of RPM investigations
in the automotive industry involved Mercedes-Benz, Audi,
Chrysler, and Dongfeng-Nissan. The following section will dis-
cuss each NDRC decision in detail.
i. The Mercedes-Benz Case
The NDRC investigation of Mercedes-Benz was full of dra-
matic plot twists. On August 3, 2014, Mercedes-Benz publicly
claimed that it would reduce the prices of some spare parts by
15 percent, on average.128 Apparently, by reducing prices, Mer-
cedes-Benz wished to escape from the “storm” of NDRC antitrust
investigations. Nine officials of the NDRC, however, still raided
the Mercedes-Benz office in Shanghai only a day after the price-
cut announcement. 129 In the raid, officials of the Provincial
Agency inspected computers and interrogated senior manag-
ers.130 The timing of the raid confused Mercedes-Benz and some
observers, who speculated that it may have been conducted be-
cause the price cut did not meet the authorities’ expectations.131
Another interesting aspect of the investigation was who issued
the final decision. Although Mercedes-Benz sells motor vehicles
throughout mainland China, and dealers in several provinces
126. Id. arts. 15, 16.
127. See id. art. 22.
128. Mercedes-Benz, Jiang Tiaozheng Bufen Weixiu Peijian Jiage (梅赛德斯-
奔驰将调整部分维修配件价格 ) [Reduces Prices of Part Auto Spare Parts],
MERCEDES-BENZ (Aug. 3, 2014), http://www.mercedes-benz.com.cn/con-
tent/china/mpc/mpc_china_website/zhng/home_mpc/passengercars/home/pas-
sengercars_world/news/2014_News/tiaozhengpeijianjiage.html [hereinafter
Mercedes-Benz Announcement].
129. Wang Yipeng & Wang Junqing, Benchi Shanghai Bangongshi Zao
Fanlongduan Tuji Jiancha (奔驰上海办公室遭反垄断突击检查 ) [Antitrust
Agency Raids Mercedes-Benz Shanghai Offices], SINA.COM (Aug. 5, 2014),
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/gsnews/20140805/085419915156.shtml.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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were investigated, only the Jiangsu Province Agency made a fi-
nal decision. Yet, the NDRC did not provide any reason for such
a selective decision.
On May 20, 2015, Jiangsu Province issued a decision with re-
spect to the RPM agreement implemented by Mercedes-Benz
and its dealers. According to the decision, Mercedes-Benz and its
dealers in Jiangsu Province agreed upon and carried out RPM
agreements through teleconferences, as well as face-to-face
meetings, to set the lowest resale price of its E-Class and S-Class
model vehicles and certain spare parts.132 According to the deci-
sion, the agency emphasized that by utilizing the market’s supe-
rior position, Mercedes-Benz deprived and interfered with the
rights of dealers to set prices, eliminated and restricted in-
trabrand competition, undermined the function of prices to allo-
cate resources, and harmed consumer interests.133
The Provincial Agency penalized Mercedes-Benz 7 percent of
its sales revenue in the previous year in Jiangsu Province, which
totaled 350 million yuan ($56.49 million USD).134 In addition,
the Provincial Agency stated that it had investigated thirty-
three dealers in Jiangsu Province and levied fines as much as 1
percent of the previous year’s sales revenue (a total of 7.87 mil-
lion yuan ($1.21million USD)) against the dealers.135 The agency,
however, did not disclose any other details of the decision.
ii. The FAW-Volkswagen Case
The FAW-Volkswagen Automobile Co., Ltd., a joint venture
between FAW Group (a Chinese company) and Volkswagen
Group (a German company), manufactures Audi and
Volkswagen cars for sale in China. On September 11, 2014, the
Provincial Agency in Hubei Province announced that it imposed
penalties on FAW-Volkswagen and its dealers for implementing
RPM agreements to restrict the prices of vehicles, after-sale ser-
vice fees, and maintenance fees.136 The Hubei Province Agency
stated that, since 2012, FAW-Volkswagen and its ten dealers in
Hubei province agreed and implemented a uniform price quota-
tion to fix resale prices or restrict minimum resale prices.137 In
132. Jiangsu Provincial Agency’s Decision on Mercedes-Benz, supra note 6.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Hubei Provincial Agency’s Decision on FAW-Volkswagen, supra note 6.
137. Id.
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addition, FAW-Volkswagen circulated notices and regulations
and established working groups to supervise whether dealers
adhered to the RPM agreements.138 Moreover, the decision noted
that, since 2013, some of the FAW-Volkswagen dealers in Hubei
Province, through exchanging price quotation and holding meet-
ings, entered into horizontal monopoly agreements.139
The Provincial Agency fined FAW-Volkswagen 6 percent of its
sales revenue earned in the previous year in the market of Hubei
Province.140 With respect to dealers, seven were fined 1 to 2 per-
cent of the sales revenue of the previous year. Two dealers were
given an exemption: one dealer was the first to report the RPM
to the Provincial Agency, provided significant evidence, and was
in a subordinate position;141 the other dealer received an exemp-
tion because it only had a minor violation and caused no dam-
age.142 One dealer was granted a mitigated penalty because it
voluntarily reported the RPM to the Provincial Agency and
played an insignificant role in implementing the RPM.143
iii. The Chrysler Case
The Shanghai Provincial Agency announced similar accusa-
tions against Chrysler and its three dealers in the Shanghai
District.144 Chrysler was accused of implementing RPM agree-
ments.145 The Provincial Agency stated that, from 2012 to 2014,
Chrysler signed RPM agreements with its dealers and circulated
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See Hubei Province Price Bureau, Mianchu Xingzheng Chufa Jueding
Shu (免除行政处罚决定书) [Decision of Administrative Penalty Exemption], NO.
1 E’JIA JIANMIAN (2014),
http://www.hbpic.gov.cn/zwgk/gfwj/xzxkhcf/201701/t20170110_23760.html
[hereinafter Hubei Price Bureau Decision of Administrative Penalty Exemp-
tion]; see also Hubei Daily, Hubei Sheng Wujiaju Kaichu Shishang Zuida
Fanlongduan Fadan (湖北省物价局开出史上最大反垄断罚单)[Hubei Provincial
Agency Issued the Largest Penalty Decision], PEOPLE.CN (Sept. 12, 2014),
http://hb.people.com.cn/n/2014/0912/c192237-22283362.html.
142. Hubei Daily, supra note 141.
143. See Hubei Province Price Bureau, Xingzheng Chufa Jueding Shu (行政
处罚决定书) [Decision of Administrative Penalty], NO. 18 E’JIA JIANCHU (2014),
http://www.hbpic.gov.cn/zwgk/gfwj/xzxkhcf/201701/t20170110_23763.html.
144. Shanghai Provincial Agency’s Decision on Chrysler, supra note 6.
145. Id.
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business polices involving price restrictions. For dealers who vi-
olated the RPM agreements, Chrysler reduced rebates, gave
fines, circulated notifications, and delayed offering the newest or
most popular products, among others.146 In addition, three Chrys-
ler dealers in the Shanghai District held a meeting on April 25,
2014, to sign a memorandum to conspire to fix prices on car
maintenance time, spare parts, vehicle paint repair, and the pe-
riod of time when price agreements would be enforced.147
Based on these facts, the Provincial Agency fined Chrysler 3
percent of its previous year’s sales revenue for implementing
RPM agreements in violation of Article 14 of the AML.148 The
Provincial Agency also imposed penalties on three dealers for
reaching horizontal monopoly agreements in violation of Article
13 of the AML.149 The dealer that was considered the organizer
of the horizontal monopoly was fined 6 percent of its previous
year’s sales revenue, and the others were fined 4 percent of their
sales revenue earned in the previous year.150
iv. The Dongfeng-Nissan Case
Dongfeng-Nissan is a joint venture between Dongfeng Motor
Corporation (a Chinese state-owned company) and Nissan (a
Japanese company) to make Nissan vehicles in China. In August
2014 the Guangdong Provincial Agency launched an investiga-
tion into Dongfeng-Nissan.151 The Provincial Agency stated that,
from 2012 to July 2014, Dongfeng-Nissan and its dealers fixed
resale prices of its vehicles and punished dealers who violated
such RPM agreements in Guangdong Province by circulating
business rules and price regulations and establishing perfor-
mance assessment systems.152 In addition, the decision men-
tioned that dealers in Guangdong Province held several meet-
ings from April 2012 to July 2014 to reach horizontal agree-
ments to fix prices.153
The Provincial Agency issued its decision in September 2015
and fined Dongfeng-Nissan 123.3 million yuan ($19.3 million
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Guangdong DRC’s Decision on Dongfeng-Nissan, supra note 5.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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USD, which was 3 percent of its sales revenue earned in the pre-
vious year), for implementing RPM agreements.154 The agency
also fined seventeen dealers a total of 19.1 million yuan ($2.98
million USD, which was 2 to 4 percent of their sales revenue
earned in the previous year) for reaching horizontal monopoly
agreements.155
II. FACTORS SHAPING THENDRC’S ENFORCEMENTDECISIONS
REGARDING RPM
Complicated and multifaceted factors have influenced and will
continue to impact the enforcement of China’s AML with respect
to RPM. These factors are divided roughly into three categories:
domestic incentives, foreign cognitive influence, and traditional
Chinese culture.
The domestic incentive is the central factor that has shaped
NDRC enforcement. The domestic incentives include two as-
pects: the impetus for launching an investigation and the discre-
tionary power enjoyed by the NDRC. The impetus determines
whether or not the NDRC will investigate a company, while the
discretionary power affects how the NDRC investigates a com-
pany.
The foreign cognitive influence, however, is a significant exter-
nal factor that influences NDRC enforcement. “Foreign cognitive
influence” is defined as knowledge of foreign law and general ex-
perience obtained by foreign regulators, which can be accessed,
utilized, and interpreted by Chinese antitrust agencies.156 To-
day, the major foreign cognitive influence comes from the United
States and the European Union, which provide important pa-
rameters for China with respect to antitrust matters. Mean-
while, the differences in attitudes toward RPM between the
United States and Europe have caused confusion with respect to
how China analyzes RPMs.
Finally, traditional Chinese culture is an internal factor that
has shaped NDRC enforcement. Its influence is often not as ob-
vious as the domestic incentive, but its impact is far-reaching.
The domestic incentive may be more unpredictable due to cer-
tain political incidents, governmental policies, and even the
NDRC’s own interests. In comparison, the impact of traditional
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Gerber, supra note 16, at 273–279.
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Chinese culture—such as the superior status of administrative
officials in Chinese society—is relatively steady and enduring
because it is deeply rooted in Chinese culture. This Part will dis-
cuss in detail how the three factors have influenced NDRC deci-
sions thus far.
A. Domestic Incentives—Impetus and Discretion
The domestic incentives determine why and how the NDRC
launches an investigation. This section will first discuss the im-
petus (besides economic consideration) for the NDRC’s decisions
to investigate certain companies and industries. Then it will dis-
cuss the discretionary power enjoyed by the NDRC and will an-
alyze the criticisms of such discretionary power.
1. Impetus for Launching an Investigation
From the cases discussed above, it is clear that there are many
factors besides economics that have affected the NDRC’s inves-
tigations. These include political, social, and policy-related rea-
sons that influence the NDRC’s decision to launch an investiga-
tion.
First, the NDRC impetus to launch investigations is signifi-
cantly influenced by political reasons. Taking the liquor case as
an example, President Xi’s determination to end prodigal and
taxpayer-financed banquets and bribery of officials was one of
the major reasons for the NDRC’s decision to launch an investi-
gation. The NDRC’s investigation can be interpreted as a re-
sponse to President Xi’s policy rather than a real attack on RPM
in the liquor market. After this investigation, the NDRC and the
Provincial Agencies did not subsequently launch further inves-
tigations into any other liquor producers,157 even though RPM
agreements were widely used in the liquor industry.158
157. Based on disclosed information by the NDRC up until the end of 2016,
the NDRC did not make any other decision on white spirit producers other
than the decision on Moutai and Wuliangye.
158. Bai Xue, Fanlongduan Bumen Zai Chujian, Baijiu Qiye Jielian Chexiao
Xianjialing(反垄断部门再出剑,白酒企业接连撤销限价令) [After Antitrust Inves-
tigation, White Spirits Producers Cease Restricting Prices], NEWS.CN (Jan. 21,
2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/food/2013-01/21/c_124255824.htm (stating
that, before the NDRC launched its investigation into Moutai and Wuliangye,
the white spirits liquor industry experienced a “golden decade” and earned ex-
travagant profits by using restrictive pricing, allowing us to infer that, other
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Furthermore, economic reasons may even justify RPM agree-
ments in the market of premium white spirits based on Marvel
and McCafferty’s “quality certification theory.”159 The quality
certification theory states that deluxe shops, knowledgeable per-
sonnel, and well-regarded reputations of retailers of goods (es-
pecially luxury goods) can be perceived by consumers as implicit
guarantees of quality.160 This argument can justify RPM since a
manufacturer hopes that, by carrying their products in upscale
stores and offering no discount, the image of quality of its items
will be preserved.161 Moreover, discounts on luxury goods may
drive consumers away from a particular brand since some con-
sumers associate high prices with a product’s prestige.162 A lower
price may indicate that certain goods should not be perceived as
“luxury” anymore. As a result, some manufacturers utilize RPM
to maintain the luxury status of their goods.
As previously mentioned, premium white spirits are regarded
as a luxury item in China. The wine producers of these spirits in
particular—Moutai and Wuliangye—could argue the potential
procompetitive effects of RPM agreements. The two wine pro-
ducers, however, did not attempt to defend their behavior on this
basis, nor did the NDRC consider the potential procompetitive
effects of RPM agreements. In short, because of political factors,
any economic argument invoked by Moutai or Wuliangye would
have been weak, if not pointless.
Second, NDRC discretion is affected by high-profile social inci-
dents that concern the public and media reports. From the back-
ground stories of the previously discussed cases (other than the
liquor case), it is obvious that people have growing complaints
about products’ high prices, including infant formula milk, cor-
rective lenses, and after-sale service of motor vehicles. Chinese
parents, for example, were furious after foreign-brand milk pro-
ducers increased their prices in the wake of the contamination
of domestic infant formula.
Certain social forces thus influence the NDRC to focus on par-
ticular industries and companies because imposing fines on well-
than Moutai and Wuliangye, many other producers also used RPM to keep re-
tail prices at a high level).
159. SeeHoward P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, Resale Price Maintenance
and Quality Certification, 15 RAND J. ECON. 346 (1984).
160. See id.
161. MOTTA, supra note 35, at 315–16.
162. Id. at 334.
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known companies and making them reduce prices would effec-
tively alleviate consumer dissatisfaction and would lead to
widely circulated reports by the media. Consequently, well-
known multinational companies, like Mercedes-Benz, FAW-
Volkswagen, and Chrysler in the vehicle market, Bausch &
Lomb and Nikon in the corrective lens market, and Wyeth and
Abbott in the infant formula milk market, become easy targets
of NDRC investigations.
Third, the tripartite enforcement system, which includes
MOFCOM, SAIC, and the NDRC, distributes the enforcement
authority over the AML amongst the three agencies. This serves
as another impetus for the NDRC to select which companies
and/or industries it should investigate because the potential
competition among the agencies motivates the NDRC to probe
certain cases that could have a significant social impact and
would be viewed by society as a remarkable achievement. Like-
wise, the potential competition among the agencies may also
cause the NDRC to avoid (or be cautious of) investigating com-
panies involved in certain interest groups, such as powerful
state-owned companies.163
Lastly, the relationship between industry policy and competi-
tion policy also influences, to some extent, the NDRC’s impetus
to investigate. The Measures for the sale of motor vehicles is an
example that reflects the changes within such a relationship.
The enactment of the Measures indeed has regulated the chaotic
market of motor vehicle distribution and has attracted foreign
automakers to invest in the Chinese market. The Measures was
geared toward the protection of manufacturers’ interests, so it
tolerated RPM agreements with the purpose of attracting auto-
motive producers to invest in China. In recent years, however,
the automotive industry has become much more prosperous and
163. For example, on November 9, 2011, the NDRC launched an investiga-
tion against two state-owned tycoons in the telecommunication market—
China Telecom and China Unicom. Due to pressure from other governmental
regulators and complicated relationships between the antitrust agencies and
the investigated companies, however, the investigation did not conclude with
definitive results. The two companies were not penalized and the NDRC did
not issue a final decision to the public. See Du Qiang, Guowuyuan Fanlong-
duan Zhuanjia: Fanlongduan Fa Dui Xingzheng Longduan Hen Wunai (国务
院反垄断专家：《反垄断法》对行政垄断很无奈) [Antitrust Expert of State Coun-
cil: The AML is Weak to Administrative Monopoly], S.URB.DAILY (Jan. 3, 2012),
http://tech.ifeng.com/telecom/special/fanlongduan/content-1/de-
tail_2012_01/03/11725660_0.shtml.
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mature in China. Therefore, the industry policy to promote the
development of the automotive industry no longer remains a pri-
ority, which gives way to competition policy.
The NDRC investigations sent a signal to all companies in the
automotive industry that RPM is no longer legal per se. Howwas
the NDRC able to communicate this message effectively? Inves-
tigating large, well-known companies was a wise strategy be-
cause investigating all RPM agreements in the automotive in-
dustry was impractical in the short-term.
In sum, the NDRC may not have intended to discriminate
against multinationals through its investigations. Ultimately,
however, the various impetuses for launching the investigations
may have led the NDRC to target multinationals or large, well-
known companies to effectively meet political or regulatory
goals, impact social issues, and alleviate much of the public’s dis-
satisfaction.
2. Discretion in Determining the Severity of Penalties
The second aspect of the domestic incentive, which helps to
shape the current picture of the enforcement of the AML, is the
discretion enjoyed by the NDRC. This is a direct result of the
ambiguous and abstract language of the AML. The wide discre-
tion enjoyed by the NDRC results in four major problems. This
section will identify and discuss these four problems that have
resulted from the NDRC’s broad discretion.
First, the ambiguous criteria for calculating the severity of
penalties under Article 46 the AML leads to inconsistent results
and grants the NDRC with wide discretion. The relevant portion
of Article 46 provides:
Where the business operators reach and fulfill a monopoly
agreement in violation of this Law, the Anti-monopoly Law En-
forcement Agency shall order them to stop the violations, con-
fiscate the illegal gains and impose a fine of 1% up to 10% of
the sales revenue made in the previous year. Where the
reached monopoly agreement has not been fulfilled, a fine of
less than 500,000 yuan may be imposed. Where a business op-
erator who is engaged in a monopoly agreement voluntarily
confesses the information about the monopoly agreement and
provides the important evidence to the Anti-monopoly Law En-
forcement Agency, the operator may be given a mitigated pun-
ishment or be exempt from punishment at the discretion of the
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Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement Agency. Where a trade asso-
ciation organizes the business operators in its own industry to
reach a monopoly agreement in violation of this Law, the Anti-
monopoly Law Enforcement Agency may impose a fine of less
than 500,000 yuan; where the circumstances are serious, the
authority in charge of social group registration may deregister
the trade association.164
In the liquor case, the NDRC imposed fines of 1 percent of the
previous year’s sales revenue on two state-owned liquor produc-
ers. The NDRC, however, did not give any reasons for why they
chose the lightest penalty of 1 percent. In addition, in the infant
formula milk case, the NDRC imposed a penalty of 4 percent of
the previous year’s sales revenue against Mead Johnson Nutri-
tion because, while it was accused of failing to cooperate with
the agency, it proactively implemented self-corrective
measures.165 Yet, in the corrective lens case, Nikon, much like
Mead Johnson Nutrition, which did not cooperate with agencies
but implemented self-corrective measures, was given a penalty
of only 2 percent of its sales revenue earned in the previous
year.166 Similarly, companies that proactively cooperated with
the agency and carried out self-corrective measures were fined 3
percent of the sales revenue earned in the previous year in the
infant formula milk case, but, in the corrective lens case, the rel-
evant companies were only fined 1 percent of sales revenue.167
This poses the question: “Why did the NDRC levy a heavier
penalty on the infant formula milk producers than it did against
the eyeglass producers?” From the facts introduced above, it is
obvious that the facts of the two cases are similar. Further, the
violations of companies in the corrective lens case were arguably
even more serious than that of the infant formula milk case be-
cause the corrective lens distributors and the industry associa-
tion were suspected of forming a price cartel to squeeze dis-
counters out of the market.
The NDRC’s discretion also applied to the distributors of the
products. For example, when the NDRC investigated RPM
agreements in the automotive market, both auto manufacturers
and distributors were investigated and fined. Yet, according to
164. AML, supra note 1, art. 46.
165. NDRC Decision on Infant Formula Milk Producers, supra note 83.
166. NDRCDecision on Corrective Lenses Producers, supra note 99.
167. See id.; see also NDRC Decision on Infant Formula Milk Producers, su-
pra note 83.
40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 42:1
the disclosed information provided by the NDRC, none of the dis-
tributors in the liquor, infant formula milk, or corrective lens
cases were investigated or fined.
In summary, the penalties varied significantly in different
cases. The NDRC, however, has not given persuasive explana-
tions for these differences. For this reason, it is easy and natural
for multinational companies to believe that the NDRC may be
investigating antitrust cases in a discriminatory and unpredict-
able manner.
Second, the AML lacks a clear definition of “sales revenue” and
does not define the market, which contributes to the wide discre-
tion wielded by the NDRC. This causes NDRC decisions to be
uncertain and unpredictable. Article 46 of the AML provides
that the agency can “impose [on an investigated company] a fine
of 1% up to 10% of the sales revenue made in the previous
year.”168 Article 46, however, does not define the term “sales rev-
enue.” It can be understood as only the involved products’ sales
revenue in the market, such as the Audi cars in the FAW-
Volkswagen case. It also can be defined, however, as the sales
revenue of all products in the market, such as all models of motor
vehicles produced by FAW-Volkswagen. Utilizing different defi-
nitions of “sales revenue” will lead to extreme variation in pen-
alties.
Moreover, the definition of “market” is also unclear. It can be
interpreted in many ways, such as sales revenue in the relevant
market, sales revenue in the Chinese market, or sales revenue
in the global market. For example, in the liquor case, the penal-
ties on Moutai and Wuliangye were calculated based on their
sales revenue in the Chinese market. In the automotive industry
case, however, penalties on automotive producers were calcu-
lated based on the sales revenue of only certain provinces, even
though the motor vehicles were distributed throughout Main-
land China.
Third, the NDRC unduly used its discretion by not confiscating
violators’ illegal gains. Although Article 46 of the AML provides
that violators’ illegal gains must be confiscated, the NDRC did
not confiscate any illegal gains from the violators in the cases
discussed above. The NDRC, however, did not provide an expla-
nation for these decisions. It seems that the NDRC inappropri-
ately used its discretion by ignoring the provisions of the AML.
168. AML, supra note 1, art. 46.
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In addition, by collecting fines without confiscating illegal gains,
the NDRC cannot sufficiently deter companies from engaging in
future anticompetitive conduct.169
Finally, the NDRC’s decision to only investigate and punish
the involved companies’ RPM agreements in certain regional
markets failed to justify its selective investigations because
these companies carried out the RPM agreements beyond these
regional markets. We look to the cases in the automotive market
as an example. Although the auto producers have enforced RPM
agreements throughout China’s market, the NDRC only investi-
gated and fined RPM agreements that were implemented re-
gionally (i.e., Mercedes-Benz in the Jiangsu Province, FAW-
Volkswagen in the Hubei Province, Chrysler in the Shanghai
District, and Dongfeng-Nissan in Guangdong Province).170Ac-
cording to media reports, when the NDRC raided the Mercedes-
Benz office in Shanghai to collect evidence of resale price-fixing,
other Provincial Agencies also raided dealers’ stores in Dalian,
Xi’an, and some cities in the Hubei Province.171 In the end, only
Mercedes-Benz and its dealers in the Jiangsu Province were
fined. The NDRC, however, did not provide persuasive explana-
tions for its selective investigations.
3. Greater Discretion—the Leniency Policy for RPM
Since the infant formula milk case, the NDRC began to adopt
a leniency policy for RPM agreements. Three infant formula pro-
ducers, two corrective lens manufacturers, and two automotive
distributors have thus been exempted from penalties because
they voluntarily reported to the NDRC and Provincial Agencies
and provided important evidence about RPM agreements.172This
169. See Wei Shibin, Zongxiang Jiage Xianzhi Xieyi Falü Shiwu Yanjiu He
Fenxi (纵向价格限制协议法律实务研究和分析) [Practical Study and Analysis of
RPM], 69 LÜSHANG ZHONGGUO FALÜ (LEXICNWEBDIGI-TAL CHINA L. REV.)
(2013), https://hk.lexiscnweb.com/clr/view_article.php?clr_id=75&clr_arti-
cle_id=941.
170. See Jiangsu Provincial Agency’s Decision on Mercedes-Benz, supra note
6; see also Hubei Provincial Agency’s Decision on FAW-Volkswagen, supra note
6; Shanghai Provincial Agency’s Decision on Chrysler, supra note 6; Guang-
dong DRC’s Decision on Dongfeng-Nissan, supra note 5.
171. Liu Xiaolin & Zhang Xiangdong, Bei Digu de Fanlongduan Fengbao (被
低估的反垄断风暴) [The Underestimated Antitrust Storm], JINGJIGUANCHABAO
[ECON. OBSERVER], Aug. 11, 2014, A1–2.
172. See NDRC Decision on Infant Formula Milk Producers, supra note 83;
see also NDRC Decision on Corrective Lenses Producers, supra note 99; Hubei
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begs the question: “Is it appropriate to apply the leniency policy
for RPM agreements?”
Countries with developed antitrust law generally apply the le-
niency policy to criminal violations of antitrust law because such
violations cause severe damage to competition but are difficult
to detect.173 Under U.S. antitrust law, for example, the leniency
policy applies to wrongdoers who “report [to antitrust agencies]
their illegal antitrust activity” in order to seek an exemption
from “criminal conviction.” 174 The reasoning for this is that
“[a]pplicants that have not engaged in criminal violations of the
antitrust laws have no need to receive leniency protection from
a criminal violation and will receive no benefit from the leniency
program.”175 Implementing RPM agreements is not a criminal
violation under U.S. antitrust law, and it is analyzed with the
rule of reason at the federal antitrust level. Therefore, compa-
nies that implement RPM agreements in the United States can-
not be granted leniency. Many other countries besides the
United States have also adopted the leniency policy to detect un-
covered cartels rather than RPM.176
The purpose of the leniency policy in antitrust law is to provide
antitrust agencies with the opportunity to obtain information
and detect illegal antitrust conduct. Some violations of antitrust
law, like cartels, have serious anticompetitive effects but are dif-
ficult to detect, so antitrust agencies grant leniency to incentiv-
ize one of the violators to report illegal conduct to the antitrust
agencies. With that in mind, is the leniency policy necessary
with respect to RPM agreements?
Price Bureau Decision of Administrative Penalty Exemption, supra note 141;
Jiangsu Provincial Agency’s Decision on Mercedes-Benz, supra note 6.
173. See generally Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Leniency for
Subsequent Applicants, at 25, DAF/COMP(2012)25 (Oct. 2012),
http://www.oecd.org/competition/Leniencyforsubsequentapplicants2012.pdf
(noting that the members’ competition authorities widely rely on leniency po-
lices to detect, investigate, and prosecute hard-core cartels).
174. SCOTT D. HAMMOND & BELINDA A. BARNETT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
FREQUENTLYASKEDQUESTIONSREGARDINGTHEANTITRUSTDIVISION’SLENIENCY
PROGRAM AND MODEL LENIENCY LETTERS 6 (2008), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/atr/frequently-asked-questions-regarding-antitrust-divisions-leni-
ency-program.
175. Id.
176. Including, for example, the European Union, France, Germany, and Ja-
pan. See OECD, supra note 173.
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The NDRCmisunderstands the leniency policy. Xu Kunlin, the
former leader of the Antitrust Bureau of NDRC, stated that not
applying the leniency policy to vertical monopoly agreements is
simply illogical. 177 In Xu’s view, horizontal agreements have
more severe anticompetitive effects than vertical ones, so it is
unreasonable to grant serious behavior leniency but refuse to
pardon behaviors that have less anticompetitive effects, such as
RPM.178 Xu misunderstands the logic behind the leniency policy.
The purpose of leniency policy is to detect and obtain infor-
mation about illegal antitrust behavior (which normally involve
criminal conduct, like cartels). In doing so, violators can avoid
penalties by reporting the violation to antitrust agencies. On the
one hand, granting a violator an exemption may lead to injustice
because he or she does not receive punishment for his or her
wrongdoing; yet, on the other hand, it may also help antitrust
agencies detect other violators and punish illegal behavior that
has serious anticompetitive effects. Due to the severe anticom-
petitive effects caused by these violations and the difficulty in
detecting them, antitrust agencies trade leniency with wrongdo-
ers to obtain evidence. This requires the balancing of efficient
enforcement and justice. As to RPM agreements, however, evi-
dence is relatively clear,179 so it is not worth doing such a trade.
Yet, even if it is reasonable to apply a leniency policy to RPM,
the NDRC investigations still have several problems. First, it is
improper for the NDRC to grant more than one company exemp-
tions. Under U.S. antitrust law, only the first qualifying wrong-
doer may be granted leniency irrespective of whether the com-
pany reports the illegal activity before or after an investigation
has begun.180 This is referred to as the “first-in-the-door” rule.181
177. Xu Kunlin, Kuanda Zhengce Shiyong Yu Zongxiang Longduan Xieyi (宽
大政策适用与纵向垄断协议) [Leniency Policy Applying to Vertical Monopoly
Agreements], ZHONGGUO JINGJI DAOBAO [CHINA ECON. HERALD] Oct. 31, 2013,
at A3.
178. Id.
179. The identical retail prices set by all (or most of the dealers) serve as
apparent evidence of RPM agreements. Especially in China, many companies
have taken RPM agreements for granted, so evidence of carrying out RPM
agreements are relatively easy to detect. For example, in the liquor case, the
chief executive officer of Moutai once said in public that the company would set
the minimum resale price of its products. See Yang Qiubo, supra note 66.
180. HAMMOND & BARNETT, supra note 174, at 4–6.
181. Id. at 3.
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Under the rule, others cannot leapfrog over the first reporter,182
which both guarantees that the regulator obtains evidence to in-
vestigate a violation and prevents abuse of the leniency policy.
If the NDRC has the right to give an unspecified number of com-
panies immunity, it runs the risk of abusing its administrative
power. In addition, unfettered use of the leniency policy does lit-
tle to deter companies from fixing prices in future.
Second, due to the lack of specific regulations about the leni-
ency policy, the NDRC’s discretionary power has been inappro-
priately expanded. The core of a well-designed leniency policy is
transparency and predictability. A leniency policy should in-
clude detailed procedures for leniency application, the criteria
for granting leniency, conditions for granting leniency or revok-
ing it, and leniency applicants’ confidentiality.183 Unfortunately,
the NDRC has not yet enacted any regulations or guidelines for
applying a leniency policy to RPM agreements.184
In order to address this problem, on February 2, 2016, the
NDRC issued the Draft of the Guidelines of Leniency Policy for
Horizontal Monopoly Agreements (“Draft of Leniency Guide-
lines”) to solicit public opinion.185 The Draft of Leniency Guide-
lines provides recommendations for how to apply the leniency
policy, including procedures, required documents, and period
limitations, among others. The Draft of Leniency Guidelines
clearly states, however, that its application is exclusive to hori-
zontal monopoly agreements.186 At this point, it is not clear if the
182. Id. at 3.
183. Id. at 1.
184. In 2010, the NDRC issued the Provisions on the Administrative Proce-
dures for Law Enforcement Against Price Fixing. See Provisions on the Admin-
istrative Procedures for Law Enforcement Against Price Fixing, supra note 47.
Article 14 of the Provisions provides that the first reporter can be immune from
penalty. For the second reporter, the penalty can be reduced by at least 50
percent. The other reporters, however, can have no more than a 50 percent
reduction of the fine. Yet, in RPM cases, the NDRC did not identify the order
of reporters, but it granted exemptions to three reporters in the infant formula
milk case, two in the corrective lens case, and two in the vehicle market cases.
The NDRC, however, did not explain why it did not apply Article 14 Provisions
to these cases.
185. Hengxiang Longduan Xieyi Anjian Kuanda Zhidu Shiyong Zhinan
(Zhengqiu Yijian Gao) (横向垄断协议案件宽大制度适用指南) （征求意见稿）
[Guideline for the Application of Leniency Policy on Horizontal Monopoly
Agreement (Draft)] (drafted by the NDRC, Feb. 3, 2016),
http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/gzdt/201602/t20160203_774297.html.
186. Id. art. 3.
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NDRC will issue another set of guidelines for RPM or whether
the NDRC is aware that the application of the leniency policy to
RPM is inappropriate.
B. Foreign Cognitive Influence
Professor Wang Xiaoye, one of the major drafters of the
AML,187 once said: “Taking U.S. antitrust law, EU competition
law, and German anticompetition law as references, the monop-
oly agreements in the AML are categorized as both horizontal
agreements and vertical agreements.”188 Therefore, the knowledge
of antitrust law and enforcement experience from the United
States and the European Union provide primary foreign cogni-
tive influences for analyzing approaches of RPM under China’s
antimonopoly laws.189
Articles 14 and 15 of the AMLwere designed and drafted based
on the framework of EU competition law. Article 14 of the AML
outlines provisions regarding vertical monopoly agreements,
and Article 15 of the AML provides exemptions to Article 14
when certain conditions are satisfied. In practice, however, Chi-
nese antitrust practitioners and academics alike have inter-
preted Articles 14 and 15 differently. As a result, there is a major
divergence between the understanding and interpretation of EU
and U.S. methods and their influences on the AML, which has
resulted in confusion about what analyzing approaches China
should use to assess the legality of RPM. Some scholars even
claim that such foreign cognitive influences have led to a strange
187. Professor Wang Xiaoye is a well-known antitrust law scholar in China
and one of the major drafters of the AML.
188. Wang Xiaoye, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanlongduan Fa Xiping (中
华人民共和国反垄断法析评) [Comments on the P. R. China’s AML], 4 FAXUE
YANJIU [CHINESE J. L.] 68, 68 (2008).
189. Some drafters of the AML, like Professor Wang Xiaoye, have an educa-
tional background in German law, so the AML also reflects the influence of
German law. But, this article will not discuss the influence of German law sep-
arately because, to some extent, German competition law has structured EU
competition law. The ideas of ordoliberal and neoliberal scholars have also con-
tributed to formation of European integration. See DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND
COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE: PROTECTING PROMETHEUS 266–
333 (1998). Therefore, we could say that EU competition law is based on the
German model. This article, however, will only discuss the influence of EU and
U.S. competition laws on China’s enforcement of the AML.
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phenomenon in China: the AML uses the content of U.S. anti-
trust law to fill in the framework of EU competition law.190 This
section will briefly describe the U.S. and EU approaches to ana-
lyzing RPM agreements and how this led to China’s confusion.
1. RPM Under U.S. Antitrust Law
Antitrust statutes of the United States, which have expansive
and open-ended language, do not provide clear and applicable
guidance for analyzing RPM. In contrast, common law decisions
gradually developed a body of law in regards to RPM, which have
helped to flesh out the meaning of the statutory language.
In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,191 the
U.S. Supreme Court established the per se rule for RPM.192
Thereafter, RPM was treated as per se illegal for nearly a cen-
tury. In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in State Oil Co. v.
Khan 193 that the price ceiling (maximum RPM) set by an oil pro-
ducer for its dealers should be treated with the rule of reason.194
It was not until 2007 that the per se rule for minimum RPM was
overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in Leegin Creative Leather
Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.195
190. Hong Yingying, supra note 107, at 57.
191. In Dr. Miles, a proprietary medicines producer sued one of its wholesal-
ers, who resold its medicine at discounted prices, refused to enter into an RPM
contract with the producer, and induced others to violate the producer’s price
restrictions. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.
373 (1911). The U.S. Supreme Court relied on the common law doctrine and
decided that a “general restraint upon alienation is ordinarily invalid.” See id.
at 404. The court reasoned that the complainant’s RPM agreement was used
as a means to limit freedom of trade and prevent price competition among deal-
ers and to harm the public interest, which would be per se illegal. See id.
192. See id.
193. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 9 (1997).
194. Under the rule of reason, RPM agreements are not per se illegal, but
agencies or courts should analyze and balance both anticompetitive and pro-
competitive effects of RPM agreements on competition and consumers. The
agreements are only illegal under the rule of reason if their anticompetitive
outweigh their procompetitive effects.
195. Leegin was a manufacturer of handbags, belts, jewelry, and other prod-
ucts under the “Brighton” brand. Leegin distributed its products through its
own stores as well as independent retailers. See Leegin Creative Leather
Prods., v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). The plaintiff, PSKS, an independent
women’s clothing and accessories store, carried the “Brighton” brand. Id. Lee-
gin imposed a minimum RPM on its distributors. Id. When PSKS sold dis-
counted “Brighton” products, Leegin terminated PSKS’ distributorship. Id.
Then PSKS sued Leegin alleging that Leegin violated the antitrust laws by
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As the purposes of antitrust law began to change, the rules
governing RPM similarly began to evolve. When the per se rule
was first established, antitrust law in the United States was as-
sociated with several purposes, such as keeping the common law
tradition 196 and protecting small and medium-sized compa-
nies.197 A relatively clear, simple, and predictable goal of anti-
trust law was not formed until the economic revolution of the
1970s, with the emergence of the Chicago School. The Chicago
School refers to an ideological movement that initially began at
the University of Chicago in the 1950s and reached its peak in
the 1970s and 1980s.198 The Chicago School advocates that effi-
ciency should be the sole purpose of antitrust law.199 It focuses
on the efficiency and effects of conduct on market prices rather
than the forms of conduct itself.200 Therefore, the Chicago School
challenges the per se rule for RPM by claiming that theDr. Miles
rule is formalistic and that the courts have ignored the RPM’s
economic purpose and its effects on consumer welfare.201 The
Chicago School believes that nearly all vertical practices, such
as RPM, “[a]re rarely or never anticompetitive.”202
entering into minimum RPM agreements with retailers. Id. Leegin did not
deny carrying out RPM agreements, but instead it challenged the per se rule
for minimum RPM itself. Id. Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
minimum RPM had procompetitive effects, which enhanced interbrand compe-
tition, facilitated market entry for new firms and brands, and encouraged deal-
ers to offer services. Id. As a result, the court concluded that minimum RPM
should not be regarded as per se illegal. Id.
196. For example, in Dr. Miles, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the right
of alienation was the essential right of property in movables, and restraints on
that would be “obnoxious to public policy.” See Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 404.
197. For example, the Robinson-Patman Act was a product of populism dur-
ing the Great Depression, the purpose of which was to protect small and inde-
pendent merchants from the chain stores’ price competition. Although the Rob-
inson-Patman Act has been criticized extensively, it has not been repealed be-
cause of the advocacy of populism. See Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13
(2012).
198. For example, see Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 925–28 (1979).
199. John J. Gibbons, Antirust, Law & Economics, and Politics, 50 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 1987, at 217, 218.
200. See DAVID J. GERBER, GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW: LAW, MARKETS, AND
GLOBALIZATION 141 (2012); see also William E. Kovasic & Carl Shapiro, Anti-
trust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking, 14 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES, no. 1., 2000, at 43, 53.
201. GELLHORN, KOVACIC, & CALKINS, supra note 14, at 341.
202. HOVENKAMP, supra note 28, at 32.
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Notably, there are two preconditions for U.S. antitrust law
changing from per se rule to rule of reason for RPM. First, a
large body of economic literature enables U.S. courts and anti-
trust agencies to conduct comprehensive economic analyses on
RPM. Second, U.S. courts play a central role in the antitrust sys-
tem so they can create relatively flexible rules for RPM to meet
the rapidly changing nature of business.
2. RPM Under EU Competition Law
Although EU competition law is based on the common law tra-
dition, RPM agreement rules highlight prominent features of the
civil law system because the European Commission, as a bu-
reaucracy, has sole authority to assess anticompetitive and pro-
competitive effects of RPM agreements in accordance with Arti-
cle 101(3) of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU).203 Therefore, unlike U.S. antitrust law, the enforcement
of EU competition law is administratively driven.
Article 101(1) of the TFEU generally prohibits RPM,204 which
is categorized as a “hardcore restriction,”205 and cannot be ap-
plied to a block exemption.206 The block exemption provides vir-
tually all vertical agreements with exemptions if the market
share of both suppliers and buyers of the agreements are below
203. Marsela Maci, The Assessment of RPM under EU Competition Rules:
Certain Inconsistencies Based on a Non-Substantive Analysis, 35 EUR.
COMPETITION L. REV. 103, 103–04 (2014).
204. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on Functioning of the European
Union art. 101 (1), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
205. Commission Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, supra note 41.
206. See Commission Regulation 330/2010, Apr. 23, 2010, O.J. (L 102), 1 (EU)
[hereinafter Regulation 330/2010]. Article 4 provides:
[T]he exemption . . . shall not apply to vertical agreements
which, directly or indirectly, in isolation or in combination
with other factors under the control of the parties, have as
their object: (a) the restriction of the buyer’s ability to deter-
mine its sale price, without prejudice to the possibility of the
supplier to impose a maximum sale price or recommend a
sale price, provided that they do not amount to a fixed or min-
imum sale price as a result of pressure from, or incentives
offered by, any of the parties. . . .
Id. art. 4.
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30 percent;207 however, RPM is excluded from applying the block
exemption, which can only be exempted on a case-by-case basis.
The U.S. Supreme Court holding in Leegin also impacted the
way the European Union views RPM agreements. In response,
the European Commission issued the Guidelines on Vertical Re-
straints in 2010 (“Vertical Guidelines”).208 Although the Vertical
Guidelines still classifies RPM agreements as a hardcore re-
straint,209 it emphasizes economic analysis in the need for a
more open-minded approach to RPM. 210 It notes that “undertak-
ings may demonstrate pro-competitive effects under Article
101(3) in an individual case,”211 which would exempt an RPM
agreement. The impact of U.S. antitrust law on the way the Eu-
ropean Union views RPM, however, is still limited. It is theoret-
ically possible for companies in Europe to claim that RPM agree-
ments create efficiencies and thus should be exempt under Arti-
cle 101(3) of the TFEU; however, in practice, this is always diffi-
cult and almost impossible.212 Dereck Ridyard, a practicing Eu-
ropean lawyer in competition law, noted in his article that “the
current treatment of RPM in EU competition law is and seems
destined to remain very hostile, [and it] is highly unlikely that
207. See Commission Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, supra note 41, sec.
III. The block exemption provides a safe harbor for most vertical agreements.
The block exemption requires three conditions that must be fulfilled in order
to exempt a vertical agreement from the prohibition of Article 101 (1) of TFEU.
First, the agreement shall not contain any hardcore restrictions. Second, both
suppliers and buyers need to have a market share cap of 30 percent. Third, the
block exemption needs to impose specific conditions on three vertical re-
straints, specifically noncompete obligations during the contract, non-compete
obligations after termination of the contract, and the exclusion of specific
brands in a selective distribution system.
208. Commission Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, supra note 41; see also
Dereck Ridyard, Resale Price Maintenance: An Overview of EU and National
Case Law, Art. No. 41915, CONCURRENCES 1, 10 (Jan. 24, 2012),
https://www.concurrences.com/en/bulletin/special-issues/Resale-Price-Mainte-
nance/.
209. Commission Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, supra note 41, para. 48.
210. See generally id. para. 5 (“Article 101 provides a legal framework for the
assessment of vertical restraints, which takes into consideration the distinc-
tion between anti-competitive and pro-competitive effects.”).
211. Id. para. 47.
212. Filippo Amato, RPM in the European Union: Any Developments Since
Leegin?, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Nov. 2013, at 1, 7,
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/76e7c33e-1d73-4393-8835-
b1507529b575/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1dd8dab7-6324-472c-
b876-b2a2328990a6/AmatoNOV-13(1).pdf.
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the EU competition law or the authorities that enforce it will
move away from its instinctive dislike of RPM.”213
In short, there are two main characteristics of the approaches
for RPM under EU competition law. First, RPM is presumed to
be anticompetitive, and overturning such a presumption is diffi-
cult. Second, unlike U.S. antitrust law, the enforcement of EU
competition law is administratively driven. The European Com-
mission is the dominant authority to assess whether RPM agree-
ments are anticompetitive, and EU courts only conduct limited
judicial review because they usually defer to European Commis-
sion decisions.214
3. Chinese Confusion in Analyzing RPM Under the AML
As mentioned earlier, the design of the AML was based off the
TFEU framework. Article 14 of the AML is similar to Article
101(1) of the TFEU and prohibits three categories of vertical re-
straints: fixing resale prices, setting minimum RPM, and other
vertical monopoly agreements identified by antitrust agen-
cies.215 In addition, similar to Article 101(3) of the TFEU, Article
15 of the AML lists conditions of exemption.
In practice, the method for analyzing RPM remains one of the
most controversial issues in China today. In the liquor case, the
NDRC did not explicitly state which analytical approach of RPM
it adopted; it simply ruled that the RPM agreement directly vio-
lated the AML.216 In the infant formula milk case, the decision
stated that the RPM agreement violated the AML generally and
that the involved companies failed to prove that the RPM agree-
ments were exempt under Article 15.217 This train of thought is
similar to the methods used under EU competition law.
In the corrective lens case, the NDRC seemed hesitant to fol-
low the EU approach to RPM agreements. The NDRC used the
term “resale price maintenance,” which is a term transplanted
from the United States, for the first time in the decision. Moreo-
ver, if the NDRC follows the EU approach, it should first apply
Article 14 to generally ban RPM, and then discuss whether an
alleged RPM can be exempted according to Article 15. The
213. Ridyard, supra note 208.
214. Maci, supra note 203, at 106.
215. AML, supra note 1, art. 14.
216. See Sichuan Provincial Agency’s Decision on Wuliangye, supra note 61;
see also Guizhou Provincial Agency’s Decision on Moutai, supra note 69.
217. See NDRC Decision on Infant Formula Milk Producers, supra note 83.
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NDRC, however, did not mention whether Article 15 could be
applied in the corrective lens case, so it seems that the NDRC
did not stick to the EU approach in this case.
In the automotive industry decisions, however, the NDRC re-
turned to the EU approach. Xu Kunlin, the former leader of the
Antitrust Bureau of the NDRC, summarized the approach to-
ward RPM as “Prohibition + Exemption.”218 Xu explained that,
under the AML, RPM agreements are generally prohibited but
may be exempted if listed conditions are satisfied in accordance
with Article 15.219 Based on Xu’s comments, we can conclude
that the NDRC has accepted the EU method with respect to
RPM agreements.
The state of RPM agreements under the AML, however, is still
in flux because agencies and courts have not yet reached a con-
sensus. For example, in Rainbow v. Johnson & Johnson,220 the
court explicitly adopted a method similar to that of the rule of
reason under the U.S. antitrust law. 221 Moreover, Professor
Huang Yong, the deputy chief of the experts panel of the Anti-
monopoly Commission, once stated in an interview that there
are two major approaches to analyzing RPM agreements in the
global antitrust community: namely, the per se rule and the rule
of reason.222From the use of terminology, it seems that the Anti-
monopoly Commission may prefer the U.S. analyzing methods
for RPM, which may directly conflict with the NDRC’s prefer-
ences for using the EU approach.
In conclusion, agencies and courts differ in their perceptions of
foreign laws and enforcement strategies. Such cognitive differ-
ences are the result of several reasons, such as different educa-
tional backgrounds of scholars with whom agencies and courts
consult, the type of information that is available to decision-
218. Xu Kunlin, supra note 177.
219. Id.
220. See Beijing Ruibang Yonghe Tech. & Trade Co., Ltd. (Rainbow) v. John-
son & Johnson Med. (Shanghai) Ltd. & Johnson & Johnson Med. (China) Ltd.,
2014 SUP. PEOPLE’SCT. GAZ. (Shanghai Higher People’s Ct. 2013) (China).
221. See id.
222. Zhou Rui, supra note 49.
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makers, and the way these decision-makers perceive and inter-
pret foreign laws and experience.223 As a result, the foreign cog-
nitive influence on the AML has caused greater uncertainty and
inconsistency in analyzing RPM.
C. The Impact of Traditional Chinese Culture—Paternalistic
Administrations
Since 2013, the NDRC has ramped up antitrust probes to “ce-
ment its reputation as the most aggressive of China’s antitrust
enforcers,”224 which has drawn heavy criticism from foreign offi-
cials and companies alike. For example, a report by Reuters de-
scribed the NDRC’s direction of investigations as “interroga-
tions,” which included “[making] threats or insinuations in face-
to-face meetings that [the companies’] employees might be held
personally liable,”225 or “[using] widespread behind-the-scenes
tactics - from personal threats to forced apologies and brow beat-
ings,”226 to push companies to confess. As the former leader of
the Antitrust Bureau of the NDRC, Xu Kunlin earned the nick-
name “Mr. Confession.”227
The way of investigation may be ascribed to the paternalistic
culture of Chinese bureaucracy to some extent. As early as the
eleventh to seventh centuries BCE, the term “parent-like offi-
cials” emerged in Chinese Classic of Poetry Collection (Shi
Jing).228 In the Book of Rites (Liji), Confucius also advocated
that “[o]fficials should act like people’s parents.”229 On the one
223. See generally David J. Gerber, Searching for a Modernized Voice: Eco-
nomics, Institutions, and Predictability in European Competition Law, 37
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1421 (2014).
224. Michael Martina &Matthew Miller, ‘Mr. Confession’ and His Boss Drive
China’s Antitrust Crusade, REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.reu-
ters.com/article/us-china-antitrust-ndrc-insight-idUSKBN0HA27X20140915.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. The term “parent-like officials” is recorded in Shijing·Daya·Jiongzhuo,
which is “Kaiti Junzi, Minzhi Fumu” (The happy and courteous sovereign, be
the parent of the people). See SHIJING (诗经) [CLASSICOF POETRY] (2015).
229. Confucius advocated the term “parent-like officials” and said that “rul-
ers should act like a dignified father and an amiable mother. Then they can be
the parent of people.” This statement has been recorded in LIJI (Book of Rites),
which is a collection of texts describing the social forms, and administration
and ceremonial rites of the Zhou Dynasty. See LIJI (礼记) [BOOKOFRITES] (Dai
Sheng ed., 2015).
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hand, this idea expresses one’s expectations that officials are re-
sponsible for the people, work hard for the people, and are de-
voted to the people. On the other hand, this concept reflects the
opinion that officials, like parents, enjoy a superior status. Par-
ents have the right to judge minors’ behaviors, and, according to
paternalism, their authority should be respected. In Chinese his-
tory, there are many legendary stories of officials, such as Hai
Rui and Bao Zheng, who acted like good parents.230 The draw-
back to such a traditional value, however, is that people can only
expect the best from their officials but cannot choose them, as
we cannot choose our parents.
Influenced by the paternalistic culture, the NDRC’s investiga-
tions highlight two features. First, the NDRC encourages tar-
geted companies to devoutly confess and proactively self-correct
their behaviors. Also, because the NDRC is in a superior posi-
tion, it ultimately determines whether companies’ confessions
and self-corrective measures satisfy its expectations. Second, the
decision-making process by the NDRC is less transparent be-
cause limited information is disclosed to the public.
Regarding the first feature, the NDRC’s tradition of paternal-
istic administration led to a culture of confessions, which encour-
ages the NDRC to treat companies who confess their violations
with more leniency. Therefore, influenced by such tradition, the
investigation will proceed and be completed quickly because
companies are incentivized to confess their violations soon after
the launch of the investigation rather than defend their actions.
In the liquor case, for example, the NDRC launched the investi-
gation in early January 2013. Only a few days later, both Moutai
and Wuliangye confessed on their official websites their viola-
tions of the AML and made promises to terminate illegal behav-
iors and issue corrective measures.231 On February 22, 2013 (less
than two months after the launch of the investigation), the Pro-
vincial Agencies announced their decision.232 ByMarch 11, 2013,
230. Hai Rui (1514–1587 CE) was a government officer of the Ming Dynasty
who was remembered as being an honest and righteous official. Bao Zheng
(999–1062 CE) was a government official during the reign of Emperor Renzong
in the Song Dynasty who represented a cultural symbol of justice and integrity
in China.
231. See Moutai Announcement, supra note 69; see also Wuliangye An-
nouncement, supra note 69.
232. See Sichuan Provincial Agency’s Decision on Wuliangye, supra note 61;
see also Guizhou Provincial Agency’s Decision on Moutai, supra note 69.
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both companies paid their respective fines in full.233 Overall, the
investigation for each liquor company took less than three
months. Such an “efficient” probe made the NDRC’s decision ap-
pear more like an administrative order than an antitrust inves-
tigation.
In addition, due to paternalistic tradition, the NDRC incentiv-
izes companies to confess and behave as the agency expects be-
cause, like a parent, the NDRC enjoys a superior status and
judges whether companies’ confessions and self-corrective be-
haviors satisfy its expectations. In the infant formula milk case,
for example, Xu Kunlin stated in an interview that the investi-
gated companies’ cooperation and self-corrective measures were
the major factors in determining the severity of the penalties im-
posed.234 Based on the disclosed information, Biostime (one of
the violators in the infant formula milk case) actually imple-
mented self-corrective measures to reduce the price; nonethe-
less, the NDRC imposed the highest level of fines on Biostime in
comparison to other companies involved in the investigation.235
An officer of the NDRC explained to the media that “Biostime
[wa]s not proactive, and the follow-up corrective measures [did]
not [do] enough, which prevent[ed] us [the NDRC] from giving a
mitigated penalty.”236 Thus, it seems that the NDRC emphasizes
companies’ sincerity and cooperation with the investigations,
speedy responses to give commitments, and self-corrective
measures. Therefore, in order to receive an exemption or a miti-
gated penalty, most of the investigated companies in RPM cases
have admitted their violations and announced rectification even
before the NDRC made its final decisions.237
233. See Chen Jie, supra note 73.
234. Jiang Guocheng, Redian Jiedu: Liu Jia Ruqi Beichu Ju’e Fadan; Jiage
Longduan, Qudao Feiyong Zuigao Sicheng (热点解读:六家乳企被处巨额罚单;价
格垄断, 渠道费用最高四成) [Hot Issue: 6 Milk Powder Producers been Imposed
Huge Fines; Price Monopoly, Distribution Fee at Most by 40%], RENMIN RIBAO
[PEOPLE’SDAILY], Aug. 8, 2013, at A9.
235. Biostime was fined 6 percent of sales volume earned in the previous
year, but other violators were given mitigated penalties of 3 to 4 percent of
sales volume earned in the previous year. See NDRC Decision on Infant For-
mula Milk Producers, supra note 83.
236. Luo Fei, Fagaiwei 6.7 Yi Dafadan Beihou de Luoji [The Logic Behind the
NDRC Imposing Huge Fines of 670Million Yuan], TENCENTFIN. (Aug. 8, 2013),
http://finance.qq.com/zt2013/focus/fgw.htm.
237. For example, right after the launch of investigation, both of the wine
producers in the liquor case that were investigated posted announcements that
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With respect to the second feature, the paternalistic tradition
leads to a less transparent decision-making process of NDRC
and limits the information disclosed to the public. Based on the
case decisions discussed above, limited information is accessible
to the public. The published information normally includes only
conclusions and simple reasoning. Necessary information is not
revealed to the public, such as information regarding the start
and end dates of investigations, evidence collected by the NDRC,
defensive arguments claimed by investigated companies,
minutes of meetings between the NDRC and companies, and
transcripts of public hearings, among others. Affected by pater-
nalistic tradition, the NDRC believes it enjoys the authority to
decide which information is included and how much detail is dis-
closed to the public. It is similar to how Chinese parents punish
their children when they misbehave: they close the door and dis-
cipline them.
This helps explain why Chinese officials have taken pains to
deny that they are enforcing the AML in a discriminatory man-
ner, because, in their minds, they conduct investigations in a pa-
ternalistic manner rather than target multinationals intention-
ally.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR CHINA: RULES AND TRANSPARENT
PROCEDURES
Although there are problems with NDRC enforcement of RPM
agreements, we should applaud the NDRC’s efforts to investi-
gate companies in various industries engaging in anticompeti-
tive practices. The NDRC’s flurry of activity has ultimately le-
gitimized the AML and improved its development.
This Part will offer suggestions as a path to normalize and
limit the NDRC’s discretion, to clarify the confusion caused by
foreign methods, and to limit the negative effects of the tradi-
admitted violations and promised to implement corrective measures. SeeMou-
tai Announcement, supra note 69; Wuliangye Announcement, supra note 69.
In the infant formula milk case, the NDRC claimed that all the investigated
companies admitted to illegally implementing RPM agreements. See NDRC
Decision on Infant Formula Milk Producers, supra note 83. In the auto distri-
bution cases, even before the agency made a decision, Mercedes-Benz claimed
on its website that it would reduce prices of spare parts. See Mercedes-Benz
Announcement, supra note 128.
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tional Chinese culture. Thus, the NDRC should develop a pre-
dictable, transparent, and consistent system of enforcement, if
not in the short-term, at least in the long-term.
First, to accomplish these goals, more regulations and guide-
lines should be drafted and issued to specify and normalize the
discretion of antitrust agencies. Like the European Union, the
enforcement of China’s antimonopoly laws is administration-ori-
ented. More specific regulations and detailed guidelines can
flesh out the abstract language of the AML on the one hand and
limit the administrative regulators’ discretion on the other hand.
Since the enactment of the AML in 2008, the NDRC has
drafted and issued several guidelines and regulations.238 There
remains, however, two roadblocks to achieving meaningful
change. First, the NDRC is unlikely to limit its own authority.
Second, guidelines and regulations issued by the NDRC are
likely to conflict with other agencies’ rules. For example, in 2015,
the SAIC issued a regulation to deal with the use of intellectual
property rights to restrict competition.239 In the same year, the
NDRC drafted a guideline to deal with the same issue.240 Incon-
sistency thus arises between the two agencies’ regulations. For
example, the provisions about the exemption of certain RPM
238. For example, the NDRC issued Provisions on the Administrative Proce-
dures for Enforcement against Price Fixing in 2010. See Provisions on the Ad-
ministrative Procedures for Law Enforcement Against Price Fixing, supra note
47. As of January 2016, the NDRC drafted four guidelines in succession to so-
licit public opinion, including the Guideline for the Leniency Policy for Hori-
zontal Agreements, the Guideline of Antimonopoly in Auto Market, the Guide-
line for Businesses Commitments, and the Guideline for Abusing of Intellec-
tual Property Rights. See Guideline for the Leniency Policy for Horizontal
Agreements (Draft) (drafted by the State Dev. & Reform Comm’n, Feb 2, 2016),
http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/fjgld/201602/t20160203_774287.html; see also Guideline
of Antimonopoly in Automotive Market (Draft) (drafted by the State Dev. &
Reform Comm’n, Mar. 23, 2016),
http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/fjgld/201603/t20160323_795740.html; Guideline for
Abusing of Intellectual Property Rights (drafted by the State Dev. & Reform
Comm’n, Dec.31, 2015) [hereinafter NDRC Antimonopoly Guideline for Abuse
of IP Rights (Draft)],
http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/fjgld/201512/t20151231_770233.html.
239. Provisions of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce on
Prohibiting the Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights to Preclude or Restrict
Competition (promulgated by the State Admin. for Indus. & Com., Apr. 7, 2015,
effective Aug.1, 2015) (Lawinfochina) (China) [hereinafter SAIC Provisions of
IPR].
240. NDRC Antimonopoly Guideline for Abuse of IP Rights (Draft), supra
note 238.
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agreements are inconsistent between the SAIC’s regulation and
the NDRC’s guideline.241Thus, this practice leads to conflicts as
well as a waste of legislative resources.
As the top tier of the enforcement body of the AML, the Anti-
monopoly Commission should be the one shouldering the respon-
sibility of issuing guidelines and regulations to normalize and
limit the agencies’ discretion. Yet, little is known with respect to
how effective the Anti-monopoly Commission has been in per-
forming its duty since the enactment of the AML. The Anti-mo-
nopoly Commission does not have its own official website.242 In-
formation about the Anti-monopoly Commission’s works, activi-
ties, members, and annual meetings is scarce and relatively in-
accessible to the public. Yet, according to Article 9 of the AML,
the responsibility of the Anti-monopoly Commission is to “for-
mulat[e] competition-related policies and guidelines, coordi-
nat[e] high-level strategies, and supervis[e] overall enforcement
of the AML.”243 As to the duty of making antitrust policies and
guidelines, however, the Anti-monopoly Commission did not
draft and issue most of the existing regulations and guidelines
but rather authorized the three agencies—the NDRC,
MOFCOM, and SAIC—to enact them. The Anti-monopoly Com-
mission also does little to satisfy the duties of coordinating and
supervising enforcement of the three agencies. In an interview,
241. Article 5 of the SAIC’s Provisions on the Prohibition of Abuse of Intel-
lectual Property Rights to Eliminate or Restrict Competition provides that
when companies and distributors’ market share in total are less than 30 per-
cent and there are at least two substitute technologies in the relevant market,
RPM agreements can be exempt from the provision of vertical monopoly agree-
ments in accordance with Article 14 of the AML. SAIC Provisions of IPR, supra
note 239, art. 5. The NDRC Antimonopoly Guideline for Abuse of Intellectual
Property Rights (Draft), however, provides that when noncompete companies
and distributors’ market share in total are less than 25 percent, or compete
companies and distributors’market share in total are less than 15 percent, the
companies’ RPM agreement can be exempted. SeeNDRC Antimonopoly Guide-
line for Abuse of IP Rights (Draft), supra note 238, sec. II, pt.3. In other words,
it provides companies with smaller market share a “safe harbor” for their
RPMs, which means that these RPMs can be exempted automatically. In any
event, however, safe harbor cannot be applied to fixed and minimum RPM
agreements.
242. Searches of the Anti-monopoly Commission on the Internet will lead to
the website of the Anti-monopoly Bureau of MOFCOM.
243. AML, supra note 1, art. 9.
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several officials of the three agencies admitted that there is al-
most no cooperation among the three agencies in practice.244 The
conflicts between the regulation enacted by the SAIC and the
guideline drafted by the NDRC regarding the abuse of intellec-
tual property right to restrict competition exemplifies the insuf-
ficient coordination amongst the three agencies.
Therefore, the Anti-monopoly Commission should draft and is-
sue regulations and guidelines about certain issues in particu-
lar: for example, specifying criteria of penalties, defining ambig-
uous terms (like “sales revenue”), clarifying if and how illegal
gains should be confiscated, and further regulating the applica-
tion of leniency policy. Furthermore, the Anti-monopoly Com-
mission’s efforts to set up more specific guidelines and rules for
antitrust agencies would curb the abuse of administrative power
and would also help to avoid inconsistent enforcement between
different antitrust agencies when they encounter same issues.
Second, analytical methods, to some extent, should mirror the
EU approaches to RPM agreements. As discussed earlier, there
are two preconditions for the United States to analyze RPMwith
the rule of reason, namely, a large body of economic literature
and the central role that U.S. courts play in the antitrust system.
Presently, however, such preconditions cannot be satisfied in
China. As a relative newcomer to enforcing antitrust law, Chi-
nese regulators and judges generally are not equipped with suf-
ficient economic knowledge and experience to conduct compre-
hensive economic analysis of RPM agreements. In addition,
courts in China do not play a central role in the antitrust law
system.
China, however, shares some similarities with the European
Union, which has an administration-oriented enforcement sys-
tem of RPM. There are two advantages if China adopts the EU
methods. First, RPM, which is still commonly used in Chinese
industries, continues to have clear anticompetitive effects in
their respective markets. For example, RPM still provides retail
dealers of corrective lenses with extravagantly high profits.245
Similarly, consumers are still paying unreasonably high prices
244. Zhang Quanwei & Zhong Jingjing, “Zhongguoshi Fanlongduan” Zhengyi
(“中国式反垄断” 争议) [Controversy over “Chinese Antimonopoly”], XINJING
NEWS (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.bjnews.com.cn/fi-
nance/2013/02/27/250000.html.
245. See Yi Fangxing & Shen Zhimin, supra note 92.
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for vehicle spare parts and after-sale services in Chinese auto-
motive market due to RPMs.246 A stricter analyzing approach to
RPM would reign in these anticompetitive effects. Second, the
European Union’s approach limits decision-makers’ discretion-
ary power. Since RPM is treated as a hardcore restriction and
can be exempted in EU competition law only under limited con-
ditions, it leaves relatively little space for the antitrust agencies
to decide the legitimacy of the RPM. Therefore, limiting and nor-
malizing the antitrust agencies’ discretion can provide more spe-
cific rules and guidelines for agency decision-making, which will
improve the predictability and certainty of antitrust enforce-
ment.
In addition, the Anti-monopoly Commission should issue rules
to clarify the analytical approach to RPM, which is critical to
solve conflicts and reduce confusion among antitrust agencies.
This could also provide reference for courts in adjudicating mat-
ters related to RPM.
Third, transparency of investigations could alleviate the nega-
tive effects of the paternalistic administration.Most of the criti-
cisms and concerns from foreign observers and companies with
respect to Chinese antimonopoly laws are in reference to the lack
of transparency within the decision-making process. The lack of
transparency of administrative activities is a cultural remnant
of Chinese tradition, which lets administrative officials feel that
they enjoy a superior status. This tradition, which culturally has
been embedded in officials’minds, makes them believe they have
246. As discussed earlier, cars in China are distributed through 4S stores.
Manufacturers utilize 4S stores to restrict retail prices, spare parts prices, and
prices of after-sale services. The parts-to-whole price ratio is used to check
whether suppliers and/or dealers gain unreasonably high profits for spare
parts and after-sale services. The parts-to-whole price ratio is defined as the
ratio between prices of all spare parts of a vehicle in total and prices of the
vehicle. A parts-to-whole price ratio below 300 percent is regarded as reasona-
ble. According to a report issued in April 2016 by China’s Insurance Associa-
tion and Chinese Automotive Maintenance and Repair Trade Association, the
two associations found that the parts-to-whole price ratios for 46 out of 100
brand automobiles in the Chinese market were over 300 percent. For some
premium cars, such as Audi, BMW, and Mercedes-Benz, their parts-to-whole
price ratios were over 500 percent. See INS. ASS’N CHINA, REPORT OF
AUTOMOTIVE PARTS-TO-WHOLE PRICE RATIOS, ISSUED BY CHINA’S INSURANCE
ASSOCIATION AND CHINA’S AUTOMOTIVE MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR TRADE
ASSOCIATION (Apr. 19, 2016), http://www.iachina.cn/content_e3ff1892-05f2-
11e6-95c5-b3e04bd54cfb.html.
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the prerogative to judge whether and which information can be
released to the public.
The situation has changed significantly, however, since the be-
ginning of the twenty-first century. The Law of the Disclosure of
Government Information was enacted in 2007,247 which legally
obligates the government to disclose information involving pub-
lic interests and the structure, duties, and working procedures
of administrative organs.248 As a result of the law, the three an-
titrust agencies are required to publish their enforcement deci-
sions.249
Thus far, however, the information disclosed by the antitrust
agencies has been insufficient. Overall, the disclosed decisions of
the NDRC are brief and only include penalties imposed on com-
panies and conclusory reasoning. Such oversimplified decisions
will naturally generate concern that the NDRC may be using
“widespread behind-the-scenes tactics”250 during investigations.
The NDRC needs to disclose more detailed information includ-
ing, but not limited to, the process of enforcement, evidence col-
lected, defensive arguments of investigated companies, minutes
of meetings between the NDRC and companies, transcripts of
public hearings, and other related information. In short, the
more transparent that the decision-making process by the
NDRC is, the more persuasive the evidence obtained by the
NDRC will be to rebut accusations of discriminatory enforce-
ment.
CONCLUSION
Since China introduced the AML in 2008, China’s efforts to
enforce the AML should be applauded. China, however, still
faces significant challenges of implementing the new antitrust
247. Regulation on the Disclosure of Government Information (promulgated
by the St. Council, Apr. 5, 2007, effective May 1, 2008), CLI.2.90387(EN) (Law-
infochina).
248. Id. art. 9.
249. As of December 31, 2015, the SAIC and its Provincial Agencies have
published 117 decisions regarding the enforcement of the AML. The NDRC and
its Provincial Agencies have published 190. The MOFCOM has completed
1,308 cases of merger review and 5 cases regarding the failure to legally declare
the concentration of business operators. See LIN WEN, ZHONGGUO FANLONGD
XINGZHENG ZHIFA BAOGAO 2008–2015（中国反垄断行政执法报告 2008–2015）
[REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE ENFORCEMENT OF ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW IN
CHINA 2008–2015], at 3 (2016).
250. Martina & Miller, supra note 224.
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law. This article discussed in detail nearly all the disclosed RPM
cases and highlighted factors that have shaped antitrust en-
forcement in China. It encouraged Chinese competition authori-
ties to flesh out the enforcement system by establishing more
specific regulations and guidelines and to disclose more detailed
information of the enforcement’s process. These steps will help
China build a predictable, consistent, and transparent system of
competition law on the one hand and will help to soundly rebut
the accusation of discrimination against multinationals on the
other.
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